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GENETICS AND RESPONSIBILITY: TO 
KNOW THE CRIMINAL FROM THE 
CRIME* 
NITA A. FARAHANY** AND JAMES E. COLEMAN JR.*** 
I understand by responsibility nothing more than actual liability to legal punishment.  
It is common to discuss this subject as if the law itself depended upon the result of 
discussions as to the freedom of the will, the origin of moral distinctions, and the 
nature of conscience.  Such discussions cannot be altogether avoided, but in legal 
inquiries they ought be noticed principally in order to show that the law does not 
really depend upon them.1 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Human behavioral genetics may enhance our understanding of human 
behavior and yet have little relevance to assigning responsibility in the criminal 
law.  As a scientific discipline, behavioral genetics seeks to understand the 
contributory roles of genetics and the environment to observed variations in 
human behavior.  Like other sciences, it assumes that all natural phenomena 
have a scientific causal explanation, but focuses primarily on the correlation 
between genetic variation and behavioral variation among individuals in a 
population.  Although the science is still in its infancy, stymied by disagreement 
over basic methodology and the definitions and metrics for measuring behavior, 
behavioral genetics evidence has already been introduced in criminal trials for a 
variety of purposes: as exculpatory evidence, to bolster preexisting legal 
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The body is not bruised to pleasure soul. 
Nor beauty born out of its own despair, 
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O chestnut-tree, great-rooted blossomer, 
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole? 
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance, 
How can we know the dancer from the dance? 
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defenses, and as mitigating evidence during sentencing.  As the science 
progresses and gains credibility, scientific results demonstrating a genetic 
contribution to behavioral differences in violence, aggression, hyperactivity, 
impulsivity, drug and alcohol abuse, antisocial personality disorder, and other 
related traits will continue to be introduced into the criminal law.  This article 
discusses practitioners’ attempts to use behavioral genetics evidence in U.S. 
criminal law cases, and explores the relationship between behavioral genetics 
and the theoretical concept of criminal responsibility as it operates in the U.S. 
criminal justice system.  It argues that irrespective of the scientific progress in 
the field of behavioral genetics, as a matter of criminal law theory, such 
evidence has little utility in assessing criminal responsibility. 
Several observations about the science of behavioral genetics inform the 
arguments presented in this article.  First, behavioral genetics does not support 
the perspective that human actions are fixed or caused by genes.  In other 
words, behavioral genetics does not support genetic determinism.  To the 
contrary, the science elucidates a complex interaction of biology and the 
environment that gives rise to behavioral differences between individuals.  The 
conceptual conflict between behavioral genetics research and genetic 
determinism is evident both from the nature of the studies and from the 
scientific results. 
Second, studies in behavioral genetics are designed to generate a population 
statistic about the correlation between behavioral variation and genetic 
variation in a population, termed an estimate of “heritability.”2  Heritability 
provides a statistical approximation of the relative contribution of genetic 
differences versus environmental differences to observed behavioral differences 
among individuals in a population.3  In contrast, it does not explain the 
relationship between the genetic profile of an individual and his behavior, nor 
does it explain the causes of any particular act by an individual.4  As a 
population statistic, heritability may vary by the age, culture, and environment 
of the population under study.5  Moreover, the old adage in statistics rings true 
here as well: correlation does not imply causation.  A statistical correlation 
between genetic differences and behavioral variation in a population does not 
translate into a causal explanation about the behavior of interest.6  In short, 
 
 2. This is explained in considerable detail in Laura A. Baker, Serena Bezdjian & Adrian Raine, 
Behavioral Genetics: The Science of Antisocial Behavior, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 
(Winter/Spring 2006), and separately by Jonathan Kaplan, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 55–67 
(Winter/Spring 2006). 
 3. Kaplan, supra note 2, at 55–58. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Thus, if a study of aggression in a population generated a heritability estimate of 0.2, one could 
not say that twenty percent of the behavior is explained by genetics, only that the differences in 
observed aggression between the individuals in that population were twenty percent correlated with 
genetic differences in that population. 
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heritability does not explain the causes of an individual’s behavior, or the causes 
of any specific act by an individual.7 
Third, behavioral genetics studies reveal that even if genetic differences 
provide insight into why individuals behave as they do, genetic differences 
contribute only one part to the overall story.8  In studies of antisocial or criminal 
behavior, behavioral geneticists report heritability estimates between 0.12 and a 
high of 0.62, meaning the genetic differences in the study population correlated 
with twelve to sixty-two percent of the differences in observed antisocial or 
criminal behavior in that population.  Thus, genetic differences failed to 
account for thirty-eight to eighty-eight percent of the observed behavioral 
variation in the population. 
These observations—that behavior is not deterministic, that heritability 
estimates refer to population rather than individual differences, and that 
genetic differences alone do not explain behavioral differences between 
individuals—would alone support limiting the introduction of behavioral 
genetics evidence in criminal cases.  Nonetheless, practitioners continue to 
introduce behavioral genetics evidence in criminal cases.  Thus, rather than 
focusing on the ever-changing scientific limitations of behavioral genetics, this 
article instead demonstrates why, as a matter of criminal law theory, behavioral 
genetics should not meaningfully inform the assessment of criminal 
responsibility. 
Part II reviews the introduction by practitioners of behavioral genetics in 
recent U.S. criminal cases and the corresponding response by courts.  This 
review illustrates that the present use of behavioral genetics evidence in 
criminal cases remains limited, and judges have by and large rejected its use.  
The rationales stated in both majority and dissenting opinions, however, leave 
the door open for future use of behavioral genetics evidence in the criminal law.  
This is of particular concern because progress in the field of behavioral genetics 
promises more specific results regarding the link between gene variants and 
behavior, such that practitioners’ use of and courts’ receptiveness to behavioral 
genetics evidence in criminal cases will likely increase. 
Parts III and IV discuss the relevance of behavioral genetics to assigning 
criminal responsibility.  “Criminal responsibility,” as that term is used in this 
article, encompasses two distinct processes in the criminal law: the 
determination of liability and the evasion or diminution of responsibility. 
Criminal liability, discussed in Part III, follows from the determination that 
an actor engaged in criminal conduct by inquiring (1) whether the defendant 
 
 7. See Baker, Bezdjian & Raine, supra note 2. 
 8. A criminal defense claiming a 1:1 correlation between genetic differences and behavior would 
be unsupportable.  See supra note 7.  However, if new scientific discoveries emerged demonstrating 
that humans in fact operate as automatons, acting solely in reaction to their biological programming, 
the foundations of criminal law doctrine discussed in this article would naturally be challenged.  Setting 
aside such an extreme improbability, this article assumes behavioral genetics will not support strong 
genetic determinism. 
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voluntarily engaged in proscribed conduct (voluntary act), and (2) if he did, 
whether he was aware of the circumstances that made his conduct criminal 
(mens rea).9  We conclude that behavioral genetics should have no bearing on 
the determination of whether an act is voluntary or whether the defendant 
acted with the requisite mens rea. 
Part IV analyzes justifications and excuses to criminal responsibility, by 
which a criminal defendant may evade or mitigate criminal liability.  This part 
explains how justifications and excuses serve as a societal check on liability by 
comparing the defendant’s conduct with that expected of the reasonable 
person—the embodiment of societal norms of conduct.10  As a result, a 
defendant’s behavioral predispositions—while potentially relevant to the 
motivations underlying his conduct—lack probative value.  Because behavioral 
genetics does not inform either liability or justifications and excuses, behavioral 
genetics should have little use in determining criminal responsibility. 
Criminal responsibility, as discussed herein, is distinct from criminal 
punishment, although they are naturally interrelated.  A defendant’s criminal 
responsibility corresponds with whether and to what extent he will be punished.  
And punishment depends upon a defendant’s personal culpability, which turns 
in part on criminal responsibility and potentially according to the individual 
characteristics of the defendant.  The rigidity of the present sentencing schemes, 
however, may limit the extent to which both the criminal and the crime receive 
consideration.  In spite of these limitations, this article proposes that the present 
system of U.S. criminal law limits the relevance of individual characteristics 
(such as behavioral predispositions) to questions of culpability, rather than 
responsibility. 
II 
CURRENT USE OF BEHAVIORAL GENETICS IN CRIMINAL CASES 
Courts have so far been skeptical of practitioners’ attempts to introduce 
evidence of genetic predispositions as grounds for obviating criminal 
responsibility or mitigating punishment.  The decisions in these cases have 
 
 9. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 454–58 (1978).  Fletcher describes the 
distinction as wrongdoing and attribution.  He explains that there is a distinction between objective 
wrongdoing, and the subjective attribution of wrongdoing.  We adopt similar reasoning, such that 
liability, as described in this article, is analogous to Fletcher’s concept of wrongdoing, while the 
discussion of justification and excuse parallels Fletcher’s discussion of attribution of wrongdoing.  
Unlike Fletcher, this article presents the attribution of wrongdoing as an objective determination, 
governed by the juror’s assessment of whether the defendant’s conduct deviated from social norms.  
Nonetheless, Fletcher points out two individualized characteristics relevant to criminal responsibility 
that this article does not discuss: infancy and insanity.  These two characteristics may exempt an 
individual from wrongdoing, but do so as narrowly circumscribed anomalies.  Neither exemption 
should afford inroads for behavioral genetics in defenses to criminal responsibility. 
 10. Id. at 459.  Fletcher describes this inquiry slightly differently: He explains that justifications and 
excuses may negate liability for a defendant, but those justifications do so by negating the wrongfulness 
of the act, while excuses suggest an absence of personal accountability on the part of the actor.  This 
article proposes that the reason an actor lacks personal culpability in the case of excuses is because 
social norms suggest the circumstances negate the extent of wrongdoing by an actor—that actor. 
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sometimes provoked dissents, however, and even the majority opinions 
(perhaps reflecting a healthy instinct for incrementalism) have not closed the 
door on such arguments in future cases.  This article is one of two that together 
will show that as a matter of criminal law theory, courts’ initial instincts are 
correct.  At least as to criminal responsibility, the door should be kept closed. 
A. Behavioral Genetics and Involuntariness 
To evade criminal liability, a handful of criminal defendants claimed to have 
committed a criminal act because of a genetic predisposition to addiction, 
violence, impulsivity, or other behavioral traits, as if they were moved by reflex 
or convulsion, rather than by free will.11  Most courts considering the claim that 
a defendant’s genetically based “overpowering compulsion” excuses him from 
criminal liability have rejected it.12  Yet practitioners continue to introduce these 
claims and scholars persist in supporting their attempts. 
The defense of “involuntariness” based on a genetic predisposition to 
compulsion has been most prevalent in the context of drug or alcohol 
addiction.13  As a general rule, voluntary intoxication is not an excuse to 
criminal liability.  But in these cases, the defendant disavows responsibility by 
claiming to have acted under the control of a drug or alcohol addiction for 
which he had a genetic predisposition.  He claims that because he labored 
involuntarily under the influence of drugs or alcohol, the criminal act was 
involuntary.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
summarized this defense in United States v. Moore: 
Appellant’s position seems to be that if a defendant is compelled to use narcotics due 
to a serious physical craving (addiction) . . . the court can find no free will on the part 
of the defendant, since he acts as a result of compulsion, not from choice.  Indeed, so 
the argument goes . . . there is really no guilt involved, merely disease.14 
In response to this defense, the court posited that an individual’s self-control is 
guided by two factors with respect to drug addiction:15  the physical craving for 
the drug and the moral standards of the defendant.16  Against this backdrop, 
“[i]n any case where the addict’s moral standards are overcome by his physical 
 
 11. Some commentators argue an individual with a genetic defect may be “so emotionally 
distressed and out of touch with his surroundings that he is unable to refrain from the act that results in 
a crime, and therefore, may not satisfy the voluntary act requirement.  If so, the man would be entitled 
to acquittal on that ground.”  Susan Horan, Comment, The XYY Supermale and the Criminal Justice 
System: A Square Peg in a Round Hole, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1343, 1372 (1992). 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 13. See, e.g., id.; State v. Boushack, No. 94-1389-CR, 1995 Wisc. App. LEXIS 378, at *4–*8 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Mar. 21, 1995) (rejecting defendant’s argument that that his genetic defect limited his self 
control generally and made his intoxication involuntary); see also Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, 
Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (Winter/Spring 2006). 
 14. 486 F.2d at 1150.  Although this case did not specifically address addiction from the perspective 
of behavioral genetics, an expert on drug addiction testified the defendant “was an addict of long 
standing, that appellant’s addiction had the characteristics of a disease, and that as a consequence 
appellant was helpless to control his compulsion to obtain and use heroin.”  Id. at 1143. 
 15. Id. at 1145. 
 16. Id. 
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craving for the drug, he may be said to lose ‘self-control,’ and it is at this point, 
and not until this point, that an addict will commit acts that violate his moral 
standards.”17  From this perspective of the defense, every criminal defendant 
who could demonstrate a predisposition to drug or alcohol addiction could 
claim that his will succumbed to his addiction.  Consequently, every criminal 
defendant with a genetic predisposition to drug or alcohol addiction could claim 
to have acted involuntarily and so evade criminal liability.  The court found it 
unwise to recognize such an expansive defense.18 
In essence, defendants who raise a genetic predisposition to drug or alcohol 
addiction challenge the temporal principle articulated in People v. Decina,19 that 
the defendant who causes harm while unconscious may be considered to have 
acted voluntarily by reason of his earlier conduct.  In Decina, the defendant 
suffered an epileptic seizure while driving his car and killed four children.20  The 
court, viewing the timeframe of the culpable conduct broadly, held the 
defendant responsible for the homicide because he was aware of the likelihood 
that he could suffer an epileptic seizure and he still chose (voluntarily) to 
drive.21  By contrast, the defendant with a genetic predisposition to addiction 
claims that he at no point made a voluntary choice.  A defendant who raises the 
defense of a genetic predisposition to drug or alcohol addiction must overcome 
the rationale of the Decina line of cases; that is, if he is aware of his genetic 
predisposition, then the choice to take drugs or alcohol could itself be treated as 
the relevant voluntary act in committing the separate criminal offense. 
In contexts other than addiction, courts’ receptiveness to claims that a 
defendant’s biological predisposition negates the actus reus required for 
criminal liability has been mixed.  For example, the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina was persuaded by the argument that the defendant’s mental disease—
severe depression arising from a genetic predisposition—rendered the homicide 
a product of disease, disassociated from the will, rather than a voluntary 
criminal act by the defendant.  In Von Dohlen v. State,22 the defendant was 
initially convicted and sentenced to death for the armed robbery and murder of 
a shop employee he shot in the back of the head.23  His conviction and sentence 
were affirmed on direct appeal, and his subsequent application for post-
conviction relief was denied.24  In support of Von Dohlen’s application for post-
conviction relief, a psychologist testified on his behalf that as a result of “his 
altered mental state ‘[the murder] was not a volitional thing but out of his 
conscious awareness or control.’”25  On appeal, the court reversed the denial of 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1146–48. 
 19. 138 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1956). 
 20. Id. at 801, 803. 
 21. Id. at 803–04; see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 91 (3d ed. 2001). 
 22. Von Dohlen v. State, 602 S.E.2d 738, 743 (S.C. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1645 (2005). 
 23. Id. at 740. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 742. 
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post-conviction relief, finding the psychological testimony created a 
“reasonable probability the outcome of the trial might have been different had 
the jury heard the available information about [the defendant’s] mental 
condition.”26  This suggests the court’s receptivity to the view that a mental 
condition arising from a genetic predisposition may render the act of 
committing a homicide the product of disease, rather than a voluntary act 
attributable to the defendant. 
Earlier, however, the same court cited with approval the rejection of a 
closely analogous claim in a case in which the defendant argued that a 
behavioral predisposition to overly emotional responses arising from frontal 
lobe brain damage rendered his act of homicide involuntary.27  In State v. 
Morris,28 the defendant appealed his conviction of voluntary manslaughter, 
arguing that psychiatric testimony at trial demonstrated that he suffered from 
frontal lobe damage and “a person with physical damage to the frontal brain 
lobes might respond with greater emotion than a normal person to any 
particular situation. . . . [S]uch an emotional response is not voluntary if it 
results from frontal lobe brain damage.”29  The South Carolina Court of 
Appeals rejected Morris’s claim: 
[T]here was no evidence that Morris involuntarily pulled his gun and shot [the victim].  
The forensic psychiatrist who testified stated a person with frontal lobe brain damage 
could have an impaired ability to control his emotional reaction to stimulus.  He 
stated . . . that he had not evaluated Morris with regard to the specific act involved in 
the [the victim’s] shooting.30 
The Court’s rationale in Morris underscores a concern courts repeatedly 
express regarding the implications of behavioral predispositions for criminal 
responsibility: the lack of an explicit causal link between behavioral 
predispositions in the abstract and the specific criminal act in question.  In other 
words, courts have recognized that behavioral genetics does not explain the 
causal relationship between an defendant’s genetic profile and his behavior, nor 
does it provide a biological explanation of the defendant’s criminal act.  For 
Morris, the causal disconnect between the frontal lobe damage and his specific 
criminal conduct bolstered the trial court’s conclusion that Morris voluntarily 
and intentionally engaged in criminal conduct.31 
A more recent concurring opinion by Ninth Circuit Judge Berzon 32 suggests 
that additional jurists are open to a claim that a defendant’s behavioral 
predisposition vitiated his volitional control.  In Dennis ex rel. Butko v. Budge, 
 
 26. Id. at 743. 
 27. State v. Pickens, 466 S.E.2d 364, 366 (S.C. 1995) (noting that in State v. Morris, 415 S.E.2d 819 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1991), the defendant had intentionally shot his gun and therefore could not claim 
involuntary manslaughter). 
 28. 415 S.E.2d 819 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991). 
 29. Id. at 821. 
 30. Id. at 821–22. 
 31. Id. at 822. 
 32. Dennis ex rel. Butko v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 895 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring). 
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the defendant Terry Dennis, at the time a Nevada state prisoner, pled guilty to 
first-degree murder and was sentenced to death.33  During the penalty phase of 
his trial, a psychiatrist testified that Dennis suffered from mental illness and had 
a long history of suicide attempts.34  The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction and sentence on direct appeal,35 and the state district court dismissed 
his subsequent petition for writ of habeas corpus.36  Before his appeal reached 
the Nevada Supreme Court, Dennis notified the relevant authorities that he 
wished to withdraw his appeal and to submit to execution.37  Dennis’s trial 
attorney then filed a next-friend petition for habeas corpus in the federal 
district court, arguing that Dennis could not competently waive his rights or 
make rational choices regarding his defense because of his mental illness.38  The 
district court rejected that claim, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that no 
clear or persuasive evidence demonstrated that Dennis irrationally chose to 
forego his appeal or that his suicidal tendencies or mental disorder fixed his 
choice.39 
Although Circuit Judge Berzon agreed with the Ninth Circuit majority on 
the ultimate outcome, she rejected the rationale of their decision: 
[The majority assumes] a vision of mental processes which precludes the possibility 
that an individual with intact cognitive capacity may, nonetheless, be unable to make a 
rational choice, not so much because the choice is not rational in an objective sense, or 
because the individual in general lacks the capacity to make rational choices, but 
because, for the person making the particular decision it is not a choice.  Instead, the 
individual’s mental disorder dictates the outcome.40 
In contrast to the majority view, Judge Berzon believes an individual may be 
competent and yet lack the capacity to make voluntary decisions: 
In effect, such a prisoner, though otherwise lucid, rational and capable of making 
reasonable choices is, in a Manchurian Candidate-like fashion, volitionally incapable 
of making a choice other than death when faced with the specific question here at 
issue—namely, whether to pursue legal proceedings that could vacate the death 
penalty or to abandon them. . . .  To make a “choice” means to exercise some measure 
of autonomy or free will among the available options, at least to the degree that an 
individual who does not suffer from a mental disorder is able to do so.41 
Although Budge concerns the voluntariness of a decision to forego further 
appeals, rather than the voluntary-act requirement for criminal liability, Judge 
Berzon’s concurring opinion signals receptiveness to a claim of involuntariness 
 
 33. Id. at 882. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Dennis v. State, 13 P.3d 434 (Nev. 2000). 
 36. Budge, 378 F.3d at 882. 
 37. Id. at 882–83. 
 38. Id. at 886–87. 
 39. Id. at 889–95. 
 40. Id. at 895. 
 41. Id. at 899 (explaining that, although Judge Berzon was persuaded that Dennis’s biological 
predisposition kept him from exercising a rational choice, the finder of fact was entitled to find 
otherwise). 
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based on behavioral biology.42  Employing reasoning such as this, some jurists 
may find it persuasive that an individual may lack the capability to exercise 
“free will” based on a biological predisposition.43 
B. Behavioral Genetics and Negation of Mens Rea 
So far, few defendants have offered evidence of a behavioral predisposition 
to negate mens rea or as a defense of diminished capacity. 44  In part, this may be 
due to the conceptual implausibility of such a defense, or at least the conceptual 
difficulty of explaining why a behavioral predisposition would negate scienter as 
that notion is understood in the criminal law.45  Rather than introducing 
behavioral predispositions to negate or reduce the degree of scienter producing 
the criminal act, defendants have more often offered such evidence in support 
of an insanity defense.46 
State v. Davis47 is one of few cases in which a defendant claimed that a 
mental defect, arising from his genetic predisposition to depression and mental 
illness, impaired his ability to form the requisite intent for his alleged criminal 
conduct.  Davis, charged with shooting a classmate, argued at trial that his 
mental condition prevented him from forming the requisite intent to commit 
first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, or possession of a weapon on 
 
 42. Dennis’s argument was not that he had a genetic predisposition to mental infirmity, nor does 
Judge Berzon’s opinion rely solely on a genetic predisposition to mental infirmity.  One could read the 
following line as recognizing a distinction between genetic predispositions and the mental disorders at 
issue in this case: “Indeed, how can a mental infirmity or disorder be distinguished from the myriad . . . 
memories, experiences and genetic predispositions that go to make up each individual’s unique 
personality?”  Id.  Although the opinion does not squarely address genetic predispositions, it 
demonstrates receptiveness to the idea that an act may be viewed as involuntary based on the 
subjective mental state of the actor, rather than by an objective determination of wrongdoing. 
 43. See generally id. at 902–07 (Berzon, J., concurring). 
 44. We discovered no case in which the defendant relied solely and specifically on a genetic 
predisposition to negate mens rea.  Nonetheless, several defendants have made the closely analogous 
claim that they could not form the requisite intent for the crime because of low serotonin levels, which 
predispose the defendant to violence or impulsiveness.  E.g., People v. Uncapher, No. 246222, 2004 
Mich. App. LEXIS 923 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2004) (arguing defendant’s biological problem of low 
serotonin diminished his ability to reason and control his impulses); Hall v. State, No. W2003-00669-
CCA-R3-PD, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 5, 2005), appeal denied, No. 
W2003-00669-SC-R11-PD, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 590 (Tenn. June 20, 2005) (presenting expert testimony 
that defendant’s low serotonin levels were correlated with violent acts, and as a result, the defendant 
was “unable . . . to achieve the mental state . . . [of] the absence of passion and excitement” necessary 
for a finding of criminal liability); State v. Payne, No. W2001-00532-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. 
App. LEXIS 998 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 20, 2002) (arguing that defendant’s low serotonin level 
rendered the defendant unable to form the requisite mental state required for second-degree murder); 
State v. Godsey, No. E2000-01944-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 926 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
Dec. 4, 2001) (introducing evidence that because of defendant’s low serotonin levels and resultant 
aggressive impulses, he could not form the requisite mental state required for second-degree murder).  
Moreover, although we do not address separately the defense of diminished capacity, a more detailed 
discussion of the issue is available in Nita Farahany, Rediscovering Criminal Responsibility Through 
Behavioral Genetics (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University) (on file with author). 
 45. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1 (4th ed. 2003). 
 46. See infra Part II.C. 
 47. No. M1999-02496-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 8, 
2001). 
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school property.48  He presented psychiatric testimony that, at the time he 
committed the alleged crimes, he suffered from a depressive disorder that 
severely impaired his capacity to deliberately commit homicide.49  The 
psychiatrist testified that Davis had a “genetic predisposition” for depression 
and mental illness, as shown by the history of severe depression in his family.50  
The jury rejected his claim,51 and the court affirmed on appeal, noting the 
perceived manifestations of Davis’s intent prior to and during the commission 
of the alleged crime had properly informed the jury’s determination of his 
mental state.52 
In People v. Bobo,53 the California Court of Appeal rejected an insanity 
defense that turned into a mens rea challenge by drawing a distinction between 
the defendant’s motive for killing her children and the determination of 
whether she acted with the requisite legal intent required for first-degree 
murder.  Diane Rochelle Bobo methodically stabbed and then drowned her 
three children.54  The jury convicted her of three counts of first-degree murder.55  
During the guilt phase of her trial, a psychiatric expert testified that Bobo 
suffered from delusions,56 and a court-appointed psychologist testified that he 
believed Bobo suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, onset by genetic factors, 
biochemical elements, and developmental experiences.57  These delusions and 
psychological conditions were introduced to inform her motive for killing her 
children.  The jury nevertheless found Bobo to have been legally sane when she 
committed the crimes.58  On appeal, Bobo challenged the sufficiency of the 
evidence to prove that she harbored malice or deliberately killed her children.59  
The California Court of Appeal rejected her claim,60 noting, with regard to 
defendant’s alleged lack of malice, the distinction between an intention to kill 
and the motivation to kill.  Because the evidence sufficiently demonstrated that 
Bobo planned and deliberately killed her children, her reasons for doing so 
were irrelevant to whether she acted with mens rea.61 
Finally, the XYY cases of the late 1960s and early 1970s represent the mixed 
use of biological predisposition both to negate mens rea and, alternatively, to 
support an insanity defense.  This parallels the use of mental illness to support a 
claim of insanity and to prove the lack of capacity to form a requisite mental 
 
 48. Id. at *18. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at *12. 
 51. Id. at *19. 
 52. Id. at *19–*26. 
 53. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
 54. Id. at 749–50. 
 55. Id. at 748. 
 56. Id. at 751–52. 
 57. Id. at 752–53. 
 58. Id. at 748. 
 59. Id. at 755. 
 60. Id. at 755–56. 
 61. Id. at 762. 
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state.  In the 1969 case of People v. Farley,62 for example, a defendant with XYY 
chromosome and a history of antisocial behavior asserted as a defense to the 
vicious rape and murder of a young woman that his deviant chromosome 
structure, coupled with a past history of psychiatric difficulties, rendered him 
incapable of formulating the necessary intent to commit murder.  Farley’s 
attorney argued that “the killing was unplanned, impulsive, the product of a 
sick, psychotic and warped mind, while he was in a psychotic state, out of touch 
with reality.”63  Farley’s defense failed, resulting in his conviction for murder.64  
The record leaves unclear the significance of the claim of incapacity for mens 
rea.  His courtroom efforts understandably focused on a garden-variety defense 
of not guilty by reason of insanity.65  A successful claim that a defendant lacks 
the capacity to form mens rea is hard to imagine, whatever the alleged basis 
claimed for incapacity. 
C. Behavioral Genetics and the Insanity Defense66 
In most jurisdictions, insanity may be asserted as an affirmative defense to 
criminal liability,67 requiring proof that the defendant suffered a disease of the 
mind, lacked awareness of his actions, could not appreciate the nature and 
quality of his actions, or lacked the ability to distinguish right from wrong.68  
Due in large part to the mental illness or defect element of the insanity defense, 
the majority of defendants who have asserted a genetic theory of insanity have 
failed to reach a jury with their claim.  Courts have almost summarily rejected 
theories of mental illness based solely on a behavioral predisposition by 
differentiating between a genetic predisposition and the traditional diagnoses of 
mental disease, such as mental illnesses including schizophrenia or bi-polar 
 
 62. The case is unpublished, but its facts and outcome are described in People v. Yukl, 372 
N.Y.S.2d 313, 320 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975); see also David B. Saxe, Psychiatry, Sociopathy, and the XYY 
Chromosome Syndrome, 6 TULSA L.J. 243, 243 (1970). 
 63. See Edith Evans Asbury, “Chromosome Slaying Trial” Begins in Queens, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 
1969, at 54 (quoting the opening statement by Farley’s defense attorney Marvyn Kornberg). 
 64. Saxe, supra note 62, at 244. 
 65. Edward C. Burks, Genetic Defense Sought in Slayings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1969, at 12; 
Telephone Interview with Marvyn Kornberg, Defense Attorney for Farley (Sept. 9, 2005).  
Nevertheless, previous articles have mistakenly characterized the defense as negating mens rea rather 
than a presentation of the insanity defense.  E.g., Saxe, supra note 62, at 243–44 (“For the first time in 
the United States, the defense attempted at the trial stage to prove that this deviant chromosome 
structure coupled with a past history of psychiatric difficulties made the defendant incapable of 
formulating the necessary mens rea to commit murder.”). 
 66. We introduce the empirical use of behavioral genetics in cases of insanity but do not explore 
the theoretical role of insanity in the criminal law.  Farahany’s dissertation, supra note 44, explores the 
complicated relationship between insanity, criminal liability, and criminal responsibility in further 
depth. 
 67. LAFAVE, supra note 45, § 7.1, at 369. 
 68. Id. § 7.2, at 377–85.  More recently, juries also have had the option of finding a defendant guilty 
but mentally ill, which further obscures the determination being made.  E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. 
§ 768.36 (2005).  A successful insanity defense results in indefinite commitment to a mental institution, 
incarceration, or both, depending on the law of the governing jurisdiction.  LAFAVE, supra note 45, § 
7.1, at 369. 
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disorder, that form the foundation of the insanity defense.  In State v. Johnson,69 
for example, the trial court rejected the defendant’s attempt to introduce 
evidence that he could not form the mental state required for the crime because 
a genetic predisposition, coupled with bad nutrition, caused him to react to 
stress in a compulsive, abnormal fashion.70  The appellate court concluded that 
although such a defense might have relevance to the unrecognized partial 
defense of diminished capacity, the alleged genetic predisposition did not 
constitute a mental defect, a threshold requirement for the insanity defense.71 
The rejection of an insanity defense based on the defendant’s chromosomal 
or behavioral predispositions has historic roots.  In the XYY claims previously 
mentioned, several defendants argued their XYY chromosomal abnormality 
established the mental defect element of the insanity defense.  Aside from 
People v. Farley,72 in no reported case73 did these claims reach a jury.  In People 
v. Tanner,74 the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to change his guilty 
plea to not guilty by reason of insanity, which he had based on the theory that 
his aggressive behavior was a result of his XYY chromosomal abnormality.75  
The Court of Appeal for the Second District of California affirmed, explaining 
that “experts [do] not suggest that all XYY individuals are by nature 
involuntarily aggressive.  Some identified XYY individuals have not exhibited 
such behavior.”76  The court noted two additional deficiencies: (1) the expert 
testimony did not link Tanner’s specific act of aggression to his chromosomal 
abnormality and (2) his experts did not testify that an extra Y chromosome 
satisfied the mental defect component of California’s variation on the 
M’Naghten rule.77  The appellate court in Millard v. State78 similarly observed 
that the “mere fact” that the defendant had an extra Y chromosome would not 
satisfy the test for legal insanity because, even if individuals with XYY are more 
“prone to aggression, are antisocial, and continually run afoul of the criminal 
laws, it is hardly sufficient to rebut the presumption of sanity.”79 
Two decades later, in State v. Thompson, the Court of Criminal Appeals of 
Tennessee expanded upon the rationale used by earlier courts to reject claims 
of insanity in the XYY cases, recognizing a distinction between evidence that an 
individual with a particular behavioral predisposition will likely act in a certain 
 
 69. 549 N.E.2d 565 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989). 
 70. Id. at 566. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See supra Part II.B. 
 73. Based on a review of cases available in Westlaw and Lexis databases. 
 74. 91 Cal. Rptr. 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970). 
 75. Id. at 659. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  The California variation of the M’Naghten rule reads as follows: “Insanity . . . means a 
disease or deranged condition of the mind which renders a person incapable of knowing or 
understanding the nature or quality of his act, or unable to distinguish right from wrong in relation to 
that act.”  Id. at 658 n.4.  See generally M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 (1843). 
 78. 261 A.2d 227 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970). 
 79. Id. at 231. 
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manner and evidence that the particular criminal defendant committed the act 
in question because of his behavioral predisposition.80  Essentially, the court 
recognized the correlation-or-causation problem inherent in behavioral 
genetics.81  Thompson offered expert testimony at trial that he suffered from 
“mild to moderate” impairment in the frontal lobe of his brain, which he 
claimed “could affect ‘impulse control, delay, the ability to think ahead and 
plan and suppress what would be an immediate reaction.’”82  Expert psychiatric 
testimony also suggested that frontal lobe impairment “would have affected 
[Thompson’s] ability to appreciate right from wrong . . . [and] could have 
prevented him from conforming his acts.”83  Although the appellate court 
opined that the psychiatric evidence rebutted the initial presumption of 
Thompson’s sanity, it nevertheless held that a reasonable juror could ultimately 
conclude, based on Thompson’s behavior leading up to and during the crime, 
that his frontal lobe deficiency did not affect him in the relevant ways such an 
impairment could affect an individual.84  Consequently, the court affirmed the 
jury’s finding that Thompson was sane when he committed the crimes and 
reinstated the verdicts for first-degree murder.85 
These cases highlight the incongruity between behavioral predispositions 
and the mental conditions traditionally required for legal insanity.  In case after 
case, courts have concluded that a defendant can appreciate the wrongfulness of 
his conduct and conform to the law notwithstanding any behavioral 
predisposition to aggression.86  On the other hand, criminal defendants have had 
some success using evidence of a genetic predisposition to bolster expert 
diagnosis of a mental condition.87  In light of current standards for admission of 
scientific evidence, this use of behavioral genetics will likely be of more 
immediate benefit to the criminal defendant than a theory of insanity grounded 
solely in a genetic predisposition to violent, aggressive, or antisocial behavior.88 
 
 80. No. E2002-02631-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 27, 
2003). 
 81. Id. at *42–*43.  See generally Kaplan, supra note 2. 
 82. Thompson, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 736, at *13–*14. 
 83. Id. at *17. 
 84. Id. at *42–*43. 
 85. Id. at *43. 
 86. Kenley v. State, 759 S.W.2d 340, 344–48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting defendant’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim because it was reasonable trial strategy for the attorney to exclude 
psychiatric testimony regarding defendant’s genetic background and childhood history of violence 
because it did not satisfy the legal requirements for insanity). 
 87. For example, in Robison v. Johnson, 151 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 1998), an expert abstained from 
testifying at trial because he believed Robison’s behavior to be drug-induced.  On appeal, the expert 
filed an affidavit that he now believed Robison’s behavior to be caused by schizophrenia rather than 
drugs, because of new evidence that Robison’s sister and other family members had been diagnosed as 
manic depressives and schizophrenics, demonstrating Robison’s genetic predisposition to the disease. 
 88. E.g., People v. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 722, 724–25 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that a 
theory of violence based on biological factors could not be introduced into evidence because a theory 
of behavior must have reached general acceptance to be introduced, although each factor considered in 
diagnosing a medical condition need not satisfy the relevant scientific admissibility standard). 
06__FARAHANY_COLEMAN.DOC 9/8/2006  3:51 PM 
128 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 69:115 
D. Behavioral Genetics and Punishment 
1. Behavioral Genetics as Mitigating Evidence 
Criminal defendants most often offer behavioral predispositions as evidence 
to mitigate punishment after a finding of guilt, rather than as a defense to 
criminal liability.89  The claim that a behavioral predisposition mitigates the 
defendant’s degree of criminal responsibility for purposes of punishment often 
resembles claims already discussed here: the defendant’s biology dictated his 
choices and he therefore acted involuntarily, or his behavioral predisposition 
prevented him from forming the requisite intent.  Simplistically put, defendants 
claim that behavioral genetics mitigates their culpability by arguing “it’s not my 
bad character; it’s my bad genes.” 
Behavioral genetics, in its many variations—whether as a genetic 
predisposition, a family history of violence, or a cycle of violence—appears 
frequently as one of many mitigating factors during sentencing in criminal cases.  
The typical case involves introduction of expert testimony regarding the 
defendant’s socioeconomic upbringing; childhood trauma; family history 
suggesting a genetic predisposition to impulsive, antisocial, or violent behavior;90 
or evidence of a genetic predisposition to drug or alcohol abuse.91  More 
recently, criminal defendants have introduced behavioral genetics as the 
principal theory of mitigation during sentencing in capital cases, rather than one 
of several mitigating factors. 
In Hill v. Ozmint, defense counsel sought to demonstrate in the sentencing 
phase of the defendant’s capital trial that the defendant suffered from serotonin 
deficiency, “attributable to genetics,” from which his aggressive impulses 
arose.92  After his arrest and incarceration, Hill had begun prescription 
medication that, according to the treating physician, successfully curbed his 
aggressive impulses.93  The theory of mitigation was that “the death penalty was 
not warranted because Hill’s aggressive behavior was genetic (thus, beyond his 
control) and treatable,”94 and that Hill in fact had been treated successfully and 
 
 89. See, e.g., People v. Sapp, 73 P.3d 433, 469–73 (Cal. 2003) (introducing the defendant’s 
psychological and neurological factors contributing to the homicide as mitigating evidence). 
 90. E.g., Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind. 2002) (opining that the defendant’s genetic 
predisposition to being a “loner” or a “hermit” based on diagnosis of schizotypal personality disorder 
was outweighed by quadruple killing in imposing the death penalty); Cauthern v. State, 145 S.Wd.3d 
571, 588 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (noting that genetic predisposition to impulsive behavior could have 
been developed and introduced as mitigating evidence at the time of trial). 
 91. E.g., State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1049 (Ariz. 1996); State v. Hartman, 476 S.E.2d 328, 342 
(N.C. 1996) (rejecting defendant’s argument that instruction to jury prevented jury from considering 
alcoholism as arising from genetic predisposition and “[w]ithout this focus, the fact of [defendant’s] 
alcoholism was more likely to be viewed simply as weakness or unmitigated choice”); State v. Scott, 800 
N.E.2d 1133, 1148-49, 1151 (Ohio 2004) (weighing genetic predisposition to drug and alcohol addiction, 
based on family history of drug abuse, as mitigating evidence during capital sentencing), cert denied, 
542 U.S. 907 (2004), application for reopening denied, 811 N.E.2d 1148 (Ohio 2004). 
 92. 339 F.3d 187, 201–02 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 93. Hill, 339 F.3d at 202; Brief of Appellant at 19, Hill v. Ozmint, No. 03-1 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 94. Hill, 339 F.3d at 202. 
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now behaved appropriately.  Three experts proffered testimony in support of 
Hill’s claim: one who discussed serotonin deficiency generally, one who had 
diagnosed Hill’s serotonin deficiency, and one who would have testified about 
Hill’s successful treatment with Prozac.95  The jury nevertheless sentenced Hill 
to death.96  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the death 
sentence on appeal97 without addressing the merits of Hill’s genetic mitigation 
theory.98  This case, however, illustrates the typical attempt by defense counsel 
to use behavioral genetics to distinguish between defendant’s choices that arise 
from his bad character (presumptively within his control) and choices that are 
the product of his genetic predisposition (presumptively outside of his 
control).99 
The defendant in Crook v. State100 fared better with a similar mitigation 
claim.  He claimed that his organic brain damage101 predisposed him to fits of 
violence.  During his initial sentencing hearing, expert witnesses testified that 
Crook suffered from frontal lobe brain damage and impulse control disorder 
arising from “his organic brain dysfunction rather than any character 
disorder.”102  The trial court sentenced Crook to death without considering the 
expert’s testimony.103  The Supreme Court of Florida vacated Crook’s death 
sentence and remanded the case to the trial court: “[C]learly, the existence of 
brain damage is a significant mitigating factor that trial courts should consider 
in deciding whether a death sentence is appropriate in a particular case.”104  On 
remand, the trial court again imposed the death penalty,105 and Crook appealed 
the proportionality of his sentence in light of the substantial evidence of the 
neurological and genetic basis for his behavior.106  The Supreme Court of 
Florida again reversed, finding Crook’s mental deficiencies were highly relevant 
to his degree of culpability for purposes of punishment and focusing on “the 
unrefuted testimony of the mental health experts that relate the rage and brutal 
 
 95. Id.  Instead of testifying about Hill’s favorable response to the medication, the third expert had 
a nervous breakdown on the stand and could not respond to questions on direct- or cross-examination; 
all while the jury laughed at this fiasco.  Id.; Brief of Appellant, supra note 93, at 19. 
 96. Hill, 339 F.3d at 189. 
 97. Hill appealed to the Fourth Circuit after the denial of federal writ of habeas corpus in the 
district court.  Id. at 190. 
 98. Id. at 202–03. 
 99. E.g., Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 65–66 (Ga. 1995).  That case is discussed in this volume.  
See Deborah W. Denno, The Legal Link Between Genetics and Crime: Vile or Viable?, 69 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 209 (Winter/Spring 2006). 
 100. 813 So.2d 68 (Fla. 2002) [hereinafter Crook I] (vacating death sentence for failure to consider 
Crook’s brain damage and mental retardation as mitigating factors); see also Crook v. State, 908 So.2d 
350 (Fla. 2005) [hereinafter Crook II] (vacating death sentence after resentencing by finding the death 
sentence was disproportionate in light of evidence of extreme mitigation). 
 101. Experts testified that Crook’s brain damage arose from his genetic background, socioeconomic 
deprivation, head trauma, substance abuse, and birth trauma.  Crook I, 813 So.2d at 72. 
 102. Id. at 70–71. 
 103. Crook II, 908 So.2d at 354. 
 104. Crook I, 813 So.2d at 74–76. 
 105. Crook II, 908 So.2d at 355. 
 106. Id. at 356. 
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conduct in this crime to the defendant’s brain damage and mental 
deficiencies.”107  Crook’s resentencing is now pending. 
With scientific progress, particularly in the relationship between specific 
genetic factors and specific behaviors, mitigation theories like Hill’s and 
Crook’s likely will become more prevalent.  But whether behavioral genetics 
serves as the principal theory of mitigation or as only one of several proffered 
mitigating factors, courts currently have little guidance for interpreting or 
weighing this evidence, particularly in light of the complexity of showing a 
causal connection between a behavioral predisposition and a specific criminal 
act.  Courts have relied on experts who have linked the defendant’s general 
behavioral propensity and his specific criminal act in only a few cases;108 the 
majority of defendants have failed to show such a causal link.  In Roberts v. 
State,109 the Arkansas Supreme Court focused on the absence of such a link in 
affirming the death sentence of Karl Douglas Roberts.  Roberts, convicted of 
the capital murder of a twelve-year-old girl, had introduced psychological and 
neurological evidence during his pretrial competency hearing, during his trial to 
negate criminal liability and responsibility, and during the sentencing phase to 
mitigate his punishment.110  The court held that Roberts had failed to connect 
evidence of his brain damage to his ability to control his emotions and actions, 
or to his ability to function socially.111  Other courts express similar concern 
about “how this [evidence] relates to the murder”112 and what weight to assign 
it.113 
2. Behavioral Genetics and the Double-Edged Sword 
Not only have criminal defendants experienced little success by introducing 
behavioral genetics during sentencing; in some cases it has cut against the 
defendant.  Courts have regarded the genetic predisposition of defendants as a 
potential aggravating sentencing factor or circumstance.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion in Landrigan v. Stewart114 provides a stark example of how this double-
 
 107. Id. at 358. 
 108. E.g., id. (finding that an expert’s testimony explained how the defendant’s fit of rage exhibited 
in the homicide was causally related to his behavioral predisposition to rage and impulse control). 
 109. 102 S.W.3d 482 (Ark. 2003). 
 110. Id. at 486–88. 
 111. Id. at 496–97. 
 112. Morris v. State, 811 So.2d 661, 668 (Fla. 2002).  This is similar to remarks made by courts in the 
XYY cases.  In State v. Roberts, 544 P.2d 754, 758 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976), for example, the court 
explained that the behavioral impact of the XYY defect had not been precisely determined nor had the 
causal connection between the XYY defect and criminal conduct been established. 
 113. See, e.g., Morris, 811 So.2d 661.  An expert testified that “people with [frontal lobe damage] 
typically make choices against the odds, that when they commit crimes, they are unplanned and 
disorganized crimes.”  Id. at 668.  The court was “left with the overall impression that impulsiveness is 
the dominant feature.  The defendant is not powerless to control his behavior, but his ability to do so 
may be substantially impaired.”  Id.  Consequently, the court gave this evidence some weight as a 
mitigating factor to the death penalty but still concluded that the death penalty was proportional to the 
crime.  Id. at 669. 
 114. 272 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2001), reh’g en banc granted, vacated, 397 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2005).  The 
Ninth Circuit recently issued an order on this case.  See Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 
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edged sword might cut against a criminal defendant.  Jeffrey Landrigan filed a 
petition for federal habeas corpus relief, claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel during the penalty phase of his capital case because his attorneys, 
following the defendant’s explicit instruction, failed to present mitigating 
evidence during the penalty phase of Landrigan’s trial.115  Four years after 
sentencing, however, Landrigan argued that notwithstanding his instructions at 
trial, he would have cooperated had his attorneys attempted to offer mitigating 
evidence demonstrating that his “biological background made him what he 
is.”116  The original Ninth Circuit panel was unpersuaded that such evidence 
would have helped with Landrigan’s sentence: 
[We find it] highly doubtful that the sentencing court would have been moved by 
information that Landrigan was a remorseless, violent killer because he was 
genetically programmed to be violent, as shown by the fact that he comes from a 
family of violent people, who are killers also . . . .  [A]lthough Landrigan’s new 
evidence can be called mitigating in some slight sense, it would also have shown the 
court that it could anticipate that he would continue to be violent . . . .  As the Arizona 
Supreme Court so aptly put it when dealing with one of Landrigan’s other claims, “[i]n 
his comments, defendant not only failed to show remorse or offer mitigating evidence, 
but he flaunted his menacing behavior.”  On this record, assuring the court that 
genetics made him the way he is could not have been very helpful.117 
The Ninth Circuit recently reheard this case en banc, and partially reversed the 
district court’s decision.   
Although the original Ninth Circuit panel recognized the potential for 
behavioral genetics to cut against the defendant, some courts and defense 
counsel have not.  In State v. Creech, the appellate court affirmed the trial 
court’s finding of the statutory aggravating circumstance “propensity to commit 
murder,”118 defined as “that person who is a willing, predisposed killer, a killer 
who tends toward destroying the life of another, one who kills with less than the 
normal amount of provocation.”119  The state had established this aggravating 
factor based on evidence of Creech’s past history of violence—including 
Creech’s guilty plea for the first-degree murder of a fellow inmate while serving 
a life sentence in the Idaho State Correctional Institute120—supported by 
evidence of a genetic predisposition to violence that the defendant offered in 
mitigation.121 
 
2006)(en banc)(affirming in part and reversing in part district court’s denial of a capital habeas petition 
because Petitioner demonstrated colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty 
phase based on counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence including Petitioner’s 
family history and mental illness, which could have resulted in sentence other than death.) 
 115. Id. at 1224. 
 116. Id. at 1228. 
 117. Id. at 1228–29 (internal citations omitted). 
 118. 966 P.2d 1, 11 (Idaho 1999); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (allowing 
aggravating factor of propensity to commit murder). 
 119. Creech, 966 P.2d at 11. 
 120. Id. at 5–6. 
 121. Id. 
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Apparently unaware of the two-sided effect of his evidence, Creech claimed 
the trial court had not given appropriate mitigating weight to his biological 
predisposition to violence.122  A psychologist had testified on Creech’s behalf 
during sentencing about a probable “biological component to Creech’s violent 
personality.”123  The appellate court concluded the trial court had accorded 
Creech’s biological predisposition due weight by accepting for sentencing 
purposes “that the defendant may be biologically predisposed to violence.”124  
Neither defense counsel’s brief125 nor the appellate court’s opinion 
acknowledged that Creech’s predisposition and history of violence were treated 
as mitigating at the same time they were deemed sufficiently aggravating to 
justify the death sentence.126 
Baker v. State Bar of California127 demonstrates the double-edged nature of 
behavioral predisposition evidence in noncapital cases.  The State Bar of 
California found attorney John David Baker had misappropriated client funds, 
failed to perform services for clients, and abandoned clients without notice.128  
As mitigating evidence, Baker introduced his drug and alcohol abuse.129  The 
court posited that such evidence might be mitigating if it suggested the conduct 
would not recur.130  Generally, drug use, itself illegal, and alcoholism, which 
adversely affects an attorney’s ability to practice, could be grounds for attorney 
disbarment.131  By contrast, however, the court considered newly discovered 
evidence of Baker’s “genetic predisposition” to alcoholism and drug abuse to 
be potentially mitigating because it gave credence to his claim that having now 
learned about his genetic predisposition, he would abstain from future drug and 
alcohol abuse.132  Consistent with the bad character versus bad genes distinction 
 
 122. Id. at 15. 
 123. Id. at 16. 
 124. Id.  At the 1995 sentencing hearing, a psychologist testified Creech had a “biological 
component” to his problems.  At the same time, the psychologist agreed that “[e]verything we do has a 
biological component” but noted that this was the only instance in which he had testified about a 
“genetic contribution.”  He explained: 
[Such evidence] is relevant in capital sentencing.  It does not mean Tom Creech is not 
competent to stand trial.  It does not—I don’t think it has any bearing on whether or not he is 
criminally responsible.  And in normal sentencing, I don’t think it is relevant.  But I do think 
in a capital sentencing, the fact that he has a biological contribution is relevant. . . .  [H]e had 
no choice over his genes.  And that probably helped contribute to his messed-up nervous 
system. 
Brief of Respondent, State v. Creech, 966 P.2d 1 (Idaho 1998) (No. 22006), 1997 WL 33769519, at 54. 
 125. Appellant’s Brief, State v. Creech, 966 P.2d 1 (Idaho 1998) (No. 22006), 1997 WL 33769521. 
 126. Although there is no discussion about the reason this evidence could be both aggravating and 
mitigating, it is possible this is another case of “bad character” versus “bad genes,” in which the 
aggravating factor addressed Creech’s bad character, while the mitigating factor addressed his bad 
genes.  But this possibility would simply underscore the point: depending on how the evidence is 
perceived, behavioral genetics could be used as an aggravating or mitigating factor in sentencing. 
 127. 781 P.2d 1344 (Cal. 1989). 
 128. Id. at 1349, 1353. 
 129. Id. at 1352–53. 
 130. Id. at 1351 n.6. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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of other cases, the court distinguished between misconduct that “was the 
product of a physical or mental disorder, or substance abuse,” and misconduct 
that arose from a voluntary choice.133  Without his genetic predisposition to drug 
and alcohol abuse, Baker likely would have been disbarred, but his discipline 
instead included only protracted probation with strict conditions, in part 
because of Baker’s “concession that he has a genetic predisposition to 
addiction.”134 
In a less direct way, prosecutors may use behavioral genetics to stigmatize or 
denigrate the character of the criminal defendant.  For example, the prosecutor 
in Johnston v. Love135 referred to the defendant’s family history of crime during 
his closing statement to the jury by accusing Johnston as coming from a “family 
of crime.”136  Although the court acknowledged that in some contexts, “this 
statement might be inappropriate, as it might indicate (for instance) a genetic 
predisposition to crime,” in this case the court was unconcerned because it 
considered the statement merely hyperbolic, not grossly denigrating.137  Because 
of cases like these, some defense counsel refuse to offer evidence of defendant’s 
genetic predisposition to violence, aggression, and related behavioral traits in 
fear that the evidence will backfire against the defendant.138  Unless such 
evidence can be used in a way that avoids the double edge, refusing to use it 
may be a prudent choice: a judge and jury are much more likely to be 
influenced in sentencing decisions by the defendant’s antisocial conduct and the 
suggestion of his continued dangerousness than by a possible genetic 
explanation for it. 
At this stage of knowledge about behavioral genetics, defense lawyers must 
carefully consider whether evidence of an alleged genetic defect will help or 
hurt the defendant.  As one commentator noted, to focus on the genetic defects 
of the individual defendant creates the danger that “he will be punished, or 
treated, for what he is or is believed to be, rather than for what he has done.  If 
his offense is minor but the possibility of his reformation is thought to be slight, 
the other side of the coin of mercy can be cruelty.”139  This point seems 
unassailable. 
 
 133. See id. at 1354. 
 134. Id. at 1345. 
 135. 940 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 136. Id. at 753 n.17. 
 137. Id. 
 138. E.g., State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320, 340 (Mo. 1993) (noting that it was not ineffective 
assistance of counsel to choose not to introduce psychiatric testimony regarding defendant’s potential 
predisposition to crime based on history of criminality in his family and past criminal acts). 
 139. Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 407 (Summer 
1958). 
06__FARAHANY_COLEMAN.DOC 9/8/2006  3:51 PM 
134 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 69:115 
III 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND BEHAVIORAL PREDISPOSITIONS 
The above cases illustrate the varied attempts by defendants to advance 
claims based on behavioral genetics to negate or mitigate criminal liability.  
These defendants have encountered problems in showing a causal connection 
between a behavioral predisposition and the specific act in question, between 
the motivation to act and the intent to act, and in satisfying the mental illness or 
defect element of the insanity defense.  Such obstacles, however, relate to the 
validity of the science and the crafting of the claim, rather than the legal 
relevance of behavioral genetics evidence.  Parts III and IV explain instead why 
behavioral genetics evidence clashes with criminal responsibility theory.  
Although the following discussion comports with the majority of case outcomes 
discussed above, it challenges the rationale employed in those opinions and 
provides a more robust reason to reject the claims presented. Moreover, the 
analysis in Parts III and IV goes against the scholarly grain140 by explaining why, 
even if one could fairly draw inferences between a genetic endowment and 
propensity toward criminal misconduct, that evidence has little relevance to 
determining a defendant’s criminal liability or his justifications or excuses to 
such liability. 
A finding of criminal liability requires the government to prove that the 
actor voluntarily engaged in a harmful or threatening act proscribed by criminal 
law and did so with the requisite mental awareness of the circumstances of fact 
that made the conduct criminal.141  These concepts are often referred to as actus 
reus and mens rea; both are prerequisites to a finding of criminal liability.142  
Circumscribing both of these concepts is the presumption in the criminal law 
that individuals are responsible agents capable of making choices and intending 
the natural consequence of their actions.  Several commentators have opined 
that behavioral genetics requires a retooling of this system of liability because 
scientific advances challenge its validity.143  Such arguments ignore that the 
 
 140. See Brock & Buchanan, supra note 153, at 68 (noting that an increase in genetic knowledge 
might increase our propensity to believe in determinism and affect human belief in free agency; 
alternately, it may not affect such beliefs if individuals neither act nor feel they are unfree); Deborah 
W. Denno, A Mind to Blame: New Views on Involuntary Acts, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 601, 603 (2003); 
Bernadette McSherry, Voluntariness, Intention and the Defense of Mental Disorders: Toward a Rational 
Approach, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 581, 593 (2003). 
 141. See LAFAVE, supra note 45, §§ 5.1, 6.1(c). 
 142. Although some criminal offenses do not require proof of mens rea, those offenses are beyond 
the scope of this article. 
 143. E.g., Marcia Johnson, Genetic Technology and Its Impact on Culpability for Criminal Actions, 
46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 443 (1998) (equating a genetic predisposition with genetic determinism and 
claiming that a defense based on a genetic predisposition negates free will and the elements of criminal 
responsibility); John L. Hill, Note, Freedom, Determinism, and The Externalization of Responsibility in 
the Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEO. L.J. 2045 (1998) (claiming that if determinism reflects 
reality, then the criminal law lacks coherence when it holds individuals criminally responsible); Note, 
The XYY Syndrome: A Challenge to Our System of Criminal Responsibility, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 232 
(1970) (using the XYY syndrome to argue that the concept of criminal responsibility rests on flawed 
notions of free will). 
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criminal law does not depend on individual capabilities: “Acts are judged by 
their tendency under known circumstances, not by the actual intent which 
accompanies them.”144  Free will, actus reus, and mens rea are tools to aid in the 
narrow determination of a defendant’s liability for a crime. 
A. Legal versus Theoretical Free Will 
When discussing behavioral genetics and criminal law, some scholars 
apparently feel obliged145 to reconcile the broad concept of free will (hereinafter 
“theoretical free will”) with new scientific discoveries about human behavior.  
These arguments miss the point.  Theoretical free will, which encompasses the 
philosophical, metaphysical, psychiatric, and biological perspectives on this 
topic, does not inform the understanding and use of free will in the criminal law 
(hereinafter “legal free will”).146  Our hope is that by articulating the limited 
purpose of legal free will, we may quiet claims that behavioral genetics 
undermines the assumption of free will underlying criminal liability.  
Whatever the interrelationship may be among the psychological, biological, 
and environmental factors that give rise to human conduct, the criminal law 
presumes that individuals actively and consciously choose to engage in criminal 
conduct.147  The criminal law views human beings as autonomous actors, not 
 
 144. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 66 (Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1991) (1981). 
 145. Of course, many scholars also recognize that behavioral genetics does not change our 
conception of human agents in criminal law.  The participants in this symposium agreed that behavioral 
genetics does not support a deterministic view of human behavior, and little, if any, discussion of free 
will took place during the conference held at Duke University School of Law on April 8–9, 2004.  But 
see, e.g., WILLIAM R. CLARK & MICHAEL GRUNSTEIN, ARE WE HARDWIRED: THE ROLE OF GENES 
IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 265 (2000) (asking whether free will actually exists and inquiring into the 
biological basis of free will); Note, The XYY Chromosome Defense, 57 GEO. L.J. 892, 912 (1968–69) 
(“If it is shown that the XYY individual finds it more difficult to control his behavior than does a 
‘normal’ individual, he obviously would not have ‘free will’ and thus could not be accommodated by an 
objective theory of penal law.”).  Still others believe that an increased understanding of a genetic 
contribution to behavior could expand notions of personal responsibility.  E.g., Robert F. Schopp, 
Natural-Born Defense Attorneys, in GENETICS AND CRIMINALITY: THE POTENTIAL MISUSE OF 
SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION IN COURT 82, 88–90 (Jeffrey R. Botkin, William M. McMahon & Leslie 
Pickering Francis eds., 1999). 
 146. Scientifically speaking, one could causally describe every human action by examining the 
biological and environmental chain of events involved.  For example, to explain the cause of raising 
one’s hand to ask a question, one would describe the environmental and cultural influences that compel 
an individual to raise his hand, the neurological and physiological pathways involved in formulating the 
question, the neurological and physiological pathways involved in deciding to raise one’s hand after 
formulating the question, and finally, the physiological description of the actual movement of the hand.  
Depending on the scientific instruments available, every physiological, neurological, and biochemical 
change in the body could be described with varying degrees of specificity in the complex pathway 
between deciding to raise one’s hand and the final movement of the hand.  But this does not suggest 
that the act of hand-raising is predetermined or outside the conscious control of the individual.  
Similarly, even if genes or gene variants involved in the causal pathway of behavior were discovered, no 
behavioral geneticists could with any credibility claim that those genes predetermine or fix the 
expression of any complex behavior, just as no credible claim can be made that one’s environmental 
upbringing fixes or predetermines one’s future behavior.  Because behavioral genetics does not support 
a deterministic view of human behavior, it should have little impact on the debate over the existence of 
theoretical free will. 
 147. HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 72–73 (1972). 
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because of a preference for arguments in support of theoretical free will, 
compatibilism, or determinism,148 or “because it is empirically verifiable.”149  
Instead, the criminal law recognizes the autonomy of human choice as 
fundamental to the operation of a modern system of laws150 and a necessary 
presumption to foster “better social arrangements” and “greater individual 
liberty.” 151  The presumption derives, in part, from the belief that “[s]ocial 
systems are strengthened by holding people responsible for their conduct,”152 
and undermined by shifting responsibility to the many factors affecting human 
behavior such as environmental influences or family upbringing.  The criminal 
law proceeds, then, by assuming that humans are responsible agents, capable of 
exercising control over their impulses, desires, and actions.153  And it influences 
responsible conduct with both a carrot and a stick: the system obligates 
members of society to abstain from prohibited conduct by threatening punitive 
sanctions and moral stigmatization, while reflecting and reifying societal norms 
to encourage more law-abiding behavior.154  Such an approach may strengthen 
the concept of criminal responsibility by preventing actors from viewing 
themselves as responsible actors in the “impoverished sense” that they are 
“’responsible when [the] government concludes that it is in the public interest 
that I be held responsible.’”155 
 Nonetheless, some persist in arguing that the tenets of criminal law must 
evolve to comport with a more scientifically robust understanding of human 
behavior.156  So the claims go, as science discovers new contributions to human 
behavior, the criminal law must accordingly redefine its system of criminal 
 
 148. Determinism embodies the idea that all human behavior is the “product of the broad array of 
causal factors that govern the choices we make,” and is thus determined by the causal factors leading to 
our choices.  Jeffrey A. Kovnik, Juvenile Culpability and Genetics, in GENETICS AND CRIMINALITY, 
supra note 145, at 213. 
 149. Robert Batey, Law and Popular Culture: Literature in a Criminal Law Course: Aeschylus, 
Burgess, Oates, Camus, Poe, and Melville, 22 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 45, 60 (1998) (citing HERBERT 
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74–75 (1968)). 
 150. Cf. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, J., dissenting) (“[I]n 
determining responsibility for crime, the law assumes ‘free will’ and then recognizes known deviations 
‘where there is broad consensus that free will does not exist’ with respect to the particular condition at 
issue.”). 
 151. Batey, supra note 149, at 60 (citing PACKER, supra note 149, at 74–75 (1968)). 
 152. Seymour L. Halleck, M.D., Responsibility and Excuse in Medicine and Law: A Utilitarian 
Perspective, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 127 (Summer 1986). 
 153. See Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74, 79–80 (1942); Dan W. Brock & 
Allen Buchanan, The Genetics of Behavior and Concepts of Free Will and Determinism, in GENETICS 
AND CRIMINALITY, supra note 145, at 69–75. 
 154. See Brock & Buchanan, supra note 153, at 69–75; see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364, 392 (2005) (making the analogous 
argument in tort law, by explaining that tort law is “not limited to functioning as a carrot or stick, 
although it can so function,” meaning that it functions not only through pricing and prohibition, but 
also by being connected in “an organic way to obligations already recognized in familiar forms of social 
interaction,” and by so doing may enjoy greater efficacy).   
 155. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 154, at 394. 
 156. See supra note 140. 
06__FARAHANY_COLEMAN.DOC 9/8/2006  3:51 PM 
Winter/Spring 2006] GENETICS AND RESPONSIBILITY 137 
responsibility. 157  Such claims subjugate the field of criminal law to metaphysics 
or science and presume that the foundation and objectives of the criminal 
justice system are and must be rooted in metaphysical or scientific explanations 
of human behavior.158  Practitioners subscribing to the appeal of such claims 
attempt to defend criminal defendants by arguing that the defendant’s 
“overwhelming compulsion” to engage in the criminal act negates the “free 
will” necessary to hold him criminally responsible for his action.159  The 
erroneous association between theoretical free will and legal free will is 
encouraged when judges (thus far, usually in dissent) express a sympathetic 
view of the merits of such arguments.160 
In fact, criminal law adopts an entirely different concept from psychology of 
human behavior by assuming that 
[T]here is a faculty called reason which is separate and apart from instinct, emotion, 
and impulse, that enables an individual to distinguish between right and wrong and 
endows him with moral responsibility for his acts.  This ordinary sense of justice still 
operates in terms of punishment.  To punish a man who lacks the power to reason is as 
undignified and unworthy as punishing an inanimate object or an animal.  A man who 
cannot reason cannot be subject to blame.  Our collective conscience does not allow 
punishment where it cannot impose blame. 
 
 157. Some commentators share the view that the “failure of the Anglo-American criminal justice 
system to consider differences in individual capacities in determining blame and punishment can be 
viewed as a conceptual and structural flaw, which renders it fundamentally unjust and inefficient.”  
Halleck, supra note 152, at 141. 
 158. FINGARETTE, supra note 147, at 76 (“[T]here is a set of legal concepts and a different set of 
metaphysical concepts. . . .  [T]hat the determinist or free-willist uses the word ‘free’ or ‘compelled’ 
should not mislead us into thinking that he is talking about the issues that are relevant in law.”). 
 159. Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401, 410 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975); see United States v. Moore, 
486 F.2d 1139, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[I]f it is the absence of free will which excuses the mere 
possessor-acquirer [for possessing narcotics], the more desperate bank robber . . . has an even more 
demonstrable lack of free will from precisely the same factors as appellant argues should excuse the 
mere possessor.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 160. See Gorham, 339 A.2d at 444–47 (Fickling, J., dissenting).  The genesis of mens rea is discussed 
at length: 
Since Congress and medical experts agree that drug dependence is characterized by “a strong 
compulsion” which reaches the level of loss of “the power of self-control” with reference to 
the individual’s drug dependence, the question for us is whether this compulsion is strong 
enough to negate mens rea as to possession and PIC for the addict’s own use. 
. . . 
. . . [W]ithout a free exercise of will, there can be no guilty mind . . . .  Over the centuries the 
law has come to recognize a number of situations where an individual lacks “free will” and is 
therefore not to be held criminally liable for knowingly engaging in prohibited conduct. 
. . . 
Although some addicts may retain the ability to choose methadone maintenance rather than 
continued use of heroine, they should not be precluded from raising a defense of drug 
dependence.  Sick persons, whether mentally ill, alcohol dependent, epileptic, etc., are not 
precluded from asserting a defense because they failed to take advantage of available 
treatment.  The relevant inquiry is into the defendant’s mental and physical condition at the 
time of the alleged offense, i.e., the addict’s “power of self-control with reference to his 
addiction.” 
Id.; see also State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 471 (R.I. 1979) (explaining that the law proceeds from the 
postulate that individuals are autonomous actors and “seeks to fashion a standard by which criminal 
offenders whose free will has been sufficiently impaired can be identified and treated” in a humane 
manner). 
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. . .  Psychology [on the other hand] is concerned with diagnosis and therapeutics and 
not with moral judgments.  It proceeds on an entirely different set of assumptions.  It 
does not conceive that there is a separate little man in the top of one’s head called 
reason whose functions it is to guide another unruly little man called instinct, emotion, 
or impulse in the way he should go.  The tendency of psychiatry is to regard what 
ordinary men call reasoning as a rationalization of behavior rather than the real cause 
of behaviour.161 
Each discipline and field operates from assumptions that best serve the 
needs of the field.  The criminal justice system assumes human actors can 
choose to engage or refrain from criminal conduct and creates societal 
standards of conduct and responsibility by “assigning blame and imposing 
punishment.”162  The medical or scientific models employ a deterministic view of 
human behavior because human conduct, human disease, and all natural 
phenomena must be causally determined to allow for diagnosis and treatment.163  
To abandon the legal perspective of human behavior and shift now from a 
presumption of conscious control the assumption of determinism would enable 
defendants to introduce an endless string of diversionary defenses claiming 
weakness of the human spirit in order to avoid criminal responsibility.164  Such 
defenses stand opposed to the historical rejection of theoretical free will in 
favor of an intentional suspension of disbelief in humans as free agents.165  In 
short, the legal system did not rely upon a theoretical understanding of free will 
to begin with,166 and need not do so now. 
B. The Voluntary Act 167 
Just as legal free will imputes agency to individuals, the criminal law 
assumes that when an individual acts, he reveals his choice to have acted.  
Notwithstanding the claims in Moore,168 Von Dohlen,169 and Budge,170 and 
 
 161. Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666–67 (D.C. 1945). 
 162. Richard C. Boldt, Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2245, 
2304–05 (1992). 
 163. Id. at 2304. 
 164. See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (opining that to allow the 
defense of addiction to justify certain types of criminal conduct in furtherance of one’s addiction would 
enable the same defense to bank robberies, street muggings, burglaries, and any other crime “which 
can be shown to be the product of . . . compulsion.”). 
 165. See Brock & Buchanan, supra note 153, at 69; see also HOLMES JR., supra note 144, at 50–51 
(explaining that the common law assumes “that every man is as able as every other to behave as they 
command,” with only a few exceptions when the “weakness is so marked as to fall into well-known 
exceptions, such as infancy or madness”). 
 166. FINGARETTE, supra note 147, at 67–69.  Fingarette rejects the idea that the legal construct of 
human will must make sense from the perspective of a psychiatrist because it is not designed to make 
psychiatric sense but to serve the purposes of criminal law. 
 167. A comprehensive and principled theory is beyond the purview of this article, which instead, 
focuses on demonstrating why behavioral genetics does not inform the objective system of criminal 
responsibility.  We seek here to demonstrate only that whether one adopts Austin’s, Hart’s, the MPC’s, 
or the “control” theory of voluntary conduct, the behavioral predispositions of an individual do not 
negate the presumption of voluntary conduct. 
 168. 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 169. 602 S.E.2d 738 (S.C. 2004). 
 170. 378 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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scholars claiming otherwise, behavioral genetics has nothing to say about 
whether an individual acted “voluntarily,” as defined by the criminal law. 
As a legal term of art,171 actus reus embodies a deeply entrenched principle 
of the criminal law: Liability may not be imposed in the absence of a criminal 
act172 attributable to the defendant.173  Absent evidence to the contrary, however, 
the criminal law presumes the defendant intended the specific act in question.174  
Because the criminal law presumes that an act implies a choice to have acted, 
actus reus focuses on the act rather than on the actor (or the crime rather than 
the criminal). 
The criminal law does, however, enable a defendant to challenge the 
presumption of agency, by deeming “involuntary” bodily movements that arise 
from natural phenomena or external forces.175  In the language of the criminal 
law, only a voluntary act satisfies the actus reus requirement; an involuntary act 
caused by natural or other phenomena will not suffice.176  Part III.A 
demonstrates practitioners’ attempts to capitalize on these exceptions with 
behavioral genetics evidence. 
Although definitions of “voluntary” vary, none is undercut by claims of 
genetic predispositions.  In Lectures on Jurisprudence, John Austin opined that 
a voluntary act means an external manifestation of the will. 177  Commentators 
have criticized his approach because it presumes active deliberation prior to 
bodily movement, a fact his opponents argue rarely occurs.178  H.L.A. Hart 
refuted Austin’s approach—by arguing that “voluntary” pertains to behavior 
that would have been otherwise had the individual willed or chosen so.179  Hart 
introduced this alternative primarily to account for unconsciousness or epilepsy, 
instances in which he posited that an actor could not have chosen to act 
 
 171. LAFAVE, supra note 45, at 302–03; MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(10) (Official Draft and 
Revised Commentaries 1985). 
 172. DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 78 (1987). 
 173. FINBARR MCAULEY & J. PAUL MCCUTCHEON, CRIMINAL LIABILITY: A GRAMMAR 121 
(2000). 
 174. In other words, a “voluntary act” in criminal law names a different concept than a “voluntary 
act” in other disciplines.  See Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but 
Critical Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and 
Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 14 (1998); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Involuntary Acts and Criminal 
Liability, 81 ETHICS 332, 333 n.3 (1971). Criminal law provides that a criminal act may be attributed to 
the accused (and therefore “voluntary”) by making two presuppositions: first, individuals have control 
over their behavior (legal free will), and second, a human agent causes the actions he performs by the 
exercise of his capacities and control. Thus, one can infer a defendant chose to act from proof that he 
engaged in the prohibited act. Because criminal law allows this inference, the question whether the 
defendant engaged voluntarily in an act does not usually arise. 
 175. See supra Part III.A (providing examples of practitioners attempting to capitalize on these 
exceptions with the use of behavioral genetics). 
 176. Id. 
 177. JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 411 
(Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885) (1861). 
 178. MCAULEY & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 173, at 124–25. 
 179. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 105 
(1968). 
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otherwise.  Another approach is to disclaim a positive definition of a voluntary 
act, defining it instead by reference to the conditions rendering an act 
involuntary.  The Model Penal Code (MPC) adopted this view180 by 
enumerating involuntary acts without offering a positivist account of voluntary 
conduct.181 
One could deduce that by defining instances of involuntary conduct, the 
MPC incorporates the assumptions of legal free will, such that except when 
otherwise enumerated, criminal law allows the inference that the operative will 
governed the act in question.  Conceptually, the MPC creates a rebuttable 
presumption to legal free will by putting beyond the purview of criminal law 
bodily movements arising during unconsciousness (for example, sleep, coma, or 
reflex) and presumed unconsciousness (hypnosis).  Carving out these 
exceptions effectively limits criminal law to punishing deliberate acts rather 
than all bodily movements or gratuitous thoughts.  The commentary to the 
MPC supports this interpretation of its approach: 
The term “voluntary” as used in this section does not inject into the criminal law 
questions about [theoretical] determinism and free will. . . .  There is sufficient 
difference between ordinary human activity and a reflex or a convulsion to make it 
desirable that they be distinguished for purposes of criminal responsibility by a term 
like “voluntary.”182 
That a defendant should be assumed to have acted voluntarily except for a few 
enumerated exceptions also comports with Herbert Packer’s explanation of the 
voluntary/involuntary act divide: 
The term [voluntary] is one that will immediately raise the hackles of the determinist, 
of whatever persuasion.  But, once again, the law’s language should not be read as 
plunging into the deep waters of free will vs. determinism, Cartesian duality, or any of 
 
 180. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (Official Draft and Revised Commentaries 1985).  The 
relevant sections read: 
Requirements of a Voluntary Act; Omission as Basis of Liability; Possession as an Act: 
(1)  A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a 
voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable. 
(2)  The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this Section: 
(a) a reflex of convulsion; 
(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep; 
(c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion; 
(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of 
the actor, either conscious or habitual. 
(3)  Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission 
unaccompanied by action unless: 
(a) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or 
(b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law. 
(4) Possession is an act, within the meaning of this Section, if the possessor knowingly 
procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient 
period to have been able to terminate his possession. 
Id. 
 181. See L.A. Zaibert, Intentionality, Voluntariness, and Culpability: A Historical-Philosophical 
Analysis, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 459, 479 (1998) (describing the confusion surrounding the definition of 
a voluntary act). 
 182. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. at 216. 
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a half-dozen other philosophic controversies that might appear to be invoked by the 
use of the term “voluntary” in relation to conduct.  The law is not affirming that some 
conduct is the product of the free exercise of conscious volition; it is excluding, in a 
crude kind of way, conduct that in any view is not.183 
Using the MPC’s approach, behavioral genetics must literally or conceptually 
explain one of the enumerated exceptions to be relevant to the voluntary act 
requirement. 
Several commentators184 have adopted the “control” theory of human 
agency, which posits that voluntary acts arise by exercise of “an element of 
control on the part of the actor.” 185  Its proponents claim that this theory affords 
the simplest and most plausible explanation of what makes an act voluntary.186  
This concept of voluntariness appears in the Von Dohlen case,187 in which Von 
Dohlen offered expert testimony that the murder “was not a volitional thing, 
but out of [the defendant’s] conscious awareness or control.”188  According to 
Finbarr McAuley and J. Paul McCutcheon, an individual need not have 
complete control or control of each event in the causal pathway of an action, so 
long as some part of the sequence lay within his control.189  Much like Hart’s 
concept of a voluntary act, the control theory presumes some choice on the part 
of the actor, and “if the actor refrained from doing that which he did, a different 
outcome would have resulted.”190  Deborah Denno takes a similar approach 
with a different solution.  She proposes that voluntary acts “constitute conduct 
subject to an individual’s control.”191  She supports this approach as the one that 
best comports with new scientific discoveries of human behavior, able to 
“accommodate new [scientific] research on voluntariness, as well as keep the 
main statement of criminal liability [scientifically] accurate, even if it is 
incomplete.”192 
Whether voluntariness is defined according to Austin’s view,193 Hart’s view, 
the MPC approach, or the control theory of human behavior, each positivist 
approach delineates certain acts as being beyond the purview of criminal law.  
Each of these approaches either implicitly or explicitly labels certain acts as 
 
 183. PACKER, supra note 149, at 76. 
 184. E.g., MCAULEY & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 173, at 127; Deborah W. Denno, Crime and 
Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269 (2002). 
 185. MCAULEY & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 173, at 27. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See supra Part II.A. 
 188. 602 S.E.2d 738, 740 (S.C. 2004). 
 189. MCAULEY & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 173, at 127. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Denno, supra note 184, at 363. 
 192. Id. at 358. 
 193. In accordance with Austin’s view that acts arising from the will are voluntary, Herbert 
Fingarette and Ann Fingarette Hasse provide a simple answer that one could apply to determine that 
behavioral genetics would not render an act involuntary: “[W]hy should behavior that is willed, even 
though the will be ‘diseased,’ be called involuntary?  This seems to be a corruption of language in order 
to achieve a desired conclusion, since it is natural and usual to hold that behavior, if willed, is 
voluntary.”  HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 60 (1979). 
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involuntary: bodily movements during coma or when arising by another’s 
physical force, automatic reflexes in response to external stimuli, and bodily 
movements while unconscious, asleep, or while sleepwalking.  To hold 
individuals accountable for “conduct that in any view is not”194 voluntary would 
render the limit of criminal sanctions to acts meaningless.195 
As for what is not voluntary, Jeffrie Murphy offers this description, which 
unifies these various approaches: 
An act . . . is involuntary if and only if the behavior . . . is explainable by factors which 
causally prevent the exercise of normal capacities of control or eliminate such 
capacities entirely.  By “causally prevent” here I mean simply the following: that the 
factors and the incapacity can be related by subsumption under a scientific law.196 
If Murphy’s definition incorporates the assumption of human agency, then 
normal human capacities include the capacity to suppress impulses or emotions 
arising from the many subconscious influences on human choice, including 
behavioral genetics.  Given this unifying definition, the average person should 
be able to suppress behavioral predispositions arising in part from her genes. 
Each theory or definition of involuntariness explicitly or implicitly includes 
simple reflexes and convulsions as involuntary acts, arising not from human 
autonomy but resulting from the body’s reaction to forces external to the 
individual.  Like the reflexive knee jerk, such involuntary acts cannot be viewed 
as arising from human agency because the capacity to abstain from acting 
cannot precede and thus cannot prevent the relevant act.  Whether the knee 
jerks does not call into question the individual’s infirmities.  The same analysis 
applies to bodily movements during a convulsive fit.197  An individual’s 
convulsive movement during a seizure cannot realistically be imputed to an 
operative and deliberate will.  Without adopting the deterministic perspective 
that humans act reflexively as a result of their genetic predispositions, the 
narrow exclusion of reflexes and convulsions as voluntary acts would not enable 
a criminal defendant to assert a parallelism between his reflexes, convulsions, 
and behavioral predispositions. 
Another example: Person B overwhelms Person A by the use of external 
force, physically moving Person A’s arm or physically forcing him to pull the 
trigger of a gun.198  Under any of the voluntary act definitions described above, 
the criminal law would attribute the voluntary act to Person B, who compels 
Person A’s movements, rather than to Person A.  The law need not question 
Person A’s subjective infirmities, but merely distinguish acts (in a legal sense, 
involving voluntariness) versus bodily movement arising by external physical 
force.  Under any view, Person A acted involuntarily or not at all. 
 
 194. PACKER, supra note 149, at 76. 
 195. Murphy, supra note 174, at 340–41. 
 196. Id. at 340. 
 197. However, under the Decina temporal rule discussed in Part II.A, one could still face liability if 
he had previous knowledge of his predisposition to convulsions by engaging in an earlier voluntary act. 
 198. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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Although behavioral genetics seems irrelevant to this exception, the Moore 
and Von Dohlen cases underscore how practitioners may seek to use behavioral 
genetics to blur this seemingly clear example of involuntary conduct.  Moore 
claimed that because of his addiction he acted “as a result of compulsion, not 
from choice,”199 while Von Dohlen’s defense expert testified that the murder 
“was not a volitional thing, but [one] out of [the defendant’s] conscious 
awareness or control.”200  To disclaim responsibility for the act, each defendant 
attributed his act to his disease, as a force distinct from himself as a responsible 
agent.  But even though each defendant conceivably established a causal factor 
in his decision to act (as those involved in raising one’s hand to ask a question), 
neither proved he acted programmatically in a predetermined manner.  A 
theory of action referencing the many subconscious factors influencing the 
choice to act differs in kind, then, rather than degree, from moving by the 
physical force of another.  To accept Moore’s and Von Dohlen’s claims would 
require parsing the subjective thought processes of defendants to determine 
whether the act should be attributed to conscious choice or to subconscious 
influences, as if these were distinct entities.  To accept otherwise—namely that 
a subconscious influence on behavior negates individual choice—would render 
all acts involuntary and therefore beyond the purview of criminal liability.  The 
Moore court appropriately rejected this approach as antithetical to the system 
of criminal liability.201 
The defense of unconsciousness202 blurs the boundaries of the voluntary act 
presumption, that is, presuming that every act is the result of conscious choice 
(albeit one affected by subconscious influences).  The defense of 
unconsciousness was recognized in the late 1800s by the Court of Appeals of 
Kentucky, which stated that because an unconscious individual lacks awareness 
of his outward actions, his circumstances, and his surroundings, “none of his 
acts during the paroxysms can rightfully be imputed to him as crimes.”203  Many 
courts have adopted or expanded this reasoning,204 such that now criminal law 
generally recognizes that during sleep, coma, or blackout, bodily movements 
occur in a state of the actor’s unawareness, rather than by choice.  But in certain 
states of physical activity, such as epileptic fugue, amnesia, extreme confusion, 
and equivalent conditions, individuals may not be unconscious so much as they 
might suffer gross impairment of self-awareness.205  These conditions create a 
gray area between consciousness and unconsciousness, promoting some to 
question the degree of unconsciousness sufficient to overcome a presumption of 
 
 199. Id. at 1150. 
 200. Von Dohlen v. State, 602 S.E.2d 738, 740 (S.C. 2004). 
 201. 486 F.2d at 1139. 
 202. Courts generally interpret unconsciousness to mean that the bodily movements of the 
individual are directed by an agency other than his own.  See MCAULEY & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 
173, at 133. 
 203. Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183 (1879) (quoting RAY’S MED. JUR. § 508). 
 204. Denno, supra note 184, at 339. 
 205. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. at 219 (Official Draft and Revised Commentaries 1985). 
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individual agency.206 “Unconsciousness” in this sense is evocative of the notion 
that one is compelled to act, without conscious choice, by her genes.  In 
actuality, the narrowness of the exception of unconsciousness in the criminal 
context suggests otherwise. 
Unconsciousness207 refers to conditions including sleep, coma, blackout, and 
stroke, or more generally to a defendant’s lack of self-awareness or awareness 
of his surroundings.  When an individual lacks self-awareness, his bodily 
movements cannot be explained by an operative will.  By contrast, the 
individual who is grossly impaired or extremely confused has self-awareness 
and some understanding of his circumstances and surroundings.  The 
presumption of voluntariness should therefore apply to his conduct.208  With 
consciousness thus understood, rarely could a defendant credibly claim that his 
behavioral predisposition rendered him unaware of his circumstances and 
surroundings.209  Moreover, to argue one’s behavioral predisposition influenced 
or overwhelmed a defendant’s choice to act could suggest that the individual 
acted consciously in response to his many subconscious stimuli.  The Supreme 
Court of New Jersey has articulated this distinction: 
Criminal responsibility must be judged at the level of the conscious.  If a person 
thinks, plans and executes the plan at that level, the criminality of his act cannot be 
denied, wholly or partially, because although he didn’t realize it, his conscious was 
influenced to think, to plan and to execute the plan by unconscious influences which 
were the product of his genes and his lifelong environment.  So . . . criminal guilt 
cannot be denied or confined . . . because [the defendant] was unaware that his 
decisions and conduct were mechanistically directed by unconscious influences . . . .210 
In short, the genetically predisposed criminal defendant acts consciously, albeit 
conceivably in part as a result of his genetic endowment.  The logic seems 
inescapable that a behavioral predisposition could not satisfy this final 
exception to the voluntary act requirement.  In practice, then, only when 
 
 206. MCAULEY & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 173, at 133–34. 
 207. We discuss unconsciousness but not automatism because of the implausibility of a court’s 
allowing the introduction of behavioral genetics to argue a defendant acted as an automaton as a result 
of his biological predispositions.  Behavioral genetics has little relevance to automatism, a relatively 
rare defense, particularly as a failure-of-proof defense to the voluntary act requirement.  Automatism 
describes the imprecisely defined condition of an individual who argues that his mental state prevented 
his mind from directing his bodily movement.  Id. at 142.  Usually, the individual is capable of action 
but not conscious of what he is doing.  Michael Corrado, The Theory of Action, 39 EMORY L.J. 1191, 
1191–92 (1990).  Courts vary widely on its meaning and content, and its applicability to the voluntary 
act requirement instead of as an affirmative defense.  MCAULEY & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 173, at 
142–46. 
 208. See infra Part IV.  The defendant still has available to him the full array of justifications and 
excuses, and determining that the defendant engaged in a voluntary act has partially satisfied one 
element of criminal liability. 
 209. Judge Berzon’s concurrence in Dennis v. Budge, which states that a “prisoner, though 
otherwise lucid, rational and capable of making choices is, in a Manchurian Candidate-like fashion, 
volitionally incapable of making a choice,” would suggest otherwise, but no behavioral geneticist 
supports the view that a behavioral predisposition would render an individual programmed like a 
Manchurian candidate.  378 F.3d 880, 889 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 210. State v. Sikora, 210 A.2d 193, 202-03 (N.J. 1965). 
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“under any view”211 a bodily movement does not arise from choice and cannot 
causally be explained by the operative will can the resulting conduct be said to 
be involuntary in criminal law. 
C. Mens Rea or Mental Culpability 
In addition to the requirement of a voluntary act or omission, criminal 
liability also requires proof of a mental state that coincides with the act or 
omission.212  This mental element is referred to as mens rea or the guilty mind.213  
Commentators have lamented the absence in American criminal law and in 
common law generally of an orderly approach to this element, “a highly 
complex cluster of problems for which the tag of mens rea stands as a 
convenient but elliptical symbol.”214  Nevertheless, it is into this complex cluster 
of problems that some are tempted to introduce behavioral genetics evidence.  
But behavioral genetics evidence does not contribute to the determination of 
whether a particular defendant had the mental state required for criminal 
offenses. 
Mens rea derives from the early notion in criminal law that an offender 
should be punished only if he acted with a “vicious will.”215  To satisfy this 
requirement necessitated proof that either malice or an intention to engage in 
the legal wrongdoing actually motivated the defendant’s conduct.216  As criminal 
law developed, however, the requisite mental element for criminal liability 
(mens rea) came to mean something quite different, and the focus shifted from 
 
 211. The “any view” analysis from Packer could serve a potential limiting function in the criminal 
law, such that in the unlikely scenario that behavioral genetics reveals a 1:1 correlation between a 
particular behavior and a particular genetic endowment, bypassing any capacity for choice or reason, 
one could use behavioral genetics as a defense of involuntary conduct.  The emergence of such 
scientific evidence, particularly from the field of behavioral genetics, is highly improbable. 
 212. LAFAVE, supra note 45, § 6.3, at 322.  There are some criminal offenses—not discussed here—
that do not require mens rea: strict liability offenses.  To the extent that behavioral genetics is relevant 
to strict liability offenses, the concerns, at least as they might relate to mens rea, are not distinguishable 
from the general concerns about making conduct that is not blameworthy criminal. 
 213. The MPC identifies the levels of mental culpability by the concepts of “purpose,” 
“knowledge,” “recklessness,” and “negligence.”  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Official Draft 
and Revised Commentaries 1985).  The higher levels of purpose and knowledge are defined such that 
the criminal act is the product of actor’s conscious mind.  Id.  The common law generally referred to 
these levels of culpability as specific intent.  The MPC identifies the lower levels of recklessness and 
negligence to mean that the criminal act or omission is the result of a risk or peril that was created by 
the actor’s conduct, which the actor unreasonably ignored (recklessness) or unreasonably failed to 
perceive.  Id.  The common law generally referred to these levels of mental culpability as general 
intent. 
 214. Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107, 108 (1962). 
 215. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971). 
 216. See Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I – Provocation, Emotional Disturbance, and 
The Model Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. REV. 243 (1986) (discussing the development of the mens rea 
requirement in criminal law).  Singer notes: 
Prior to the nineteenth century, the criminal law of England and this country took seriously 
the requirement that a defendant could not be found guilty of an offense unless he truly acted 
in a malicious and malevolent way—that he not only had “the” mental state for the crime, but 
that more generally, he manifested a full-blown mens rea: an “evil mind.” 
Id. at 243 (citation omitted). 
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assessing the individual character of the defendant to the more utilitarian goal 
of deterring illegal conduct through the threat of moral condemnation and 
physical punishment.217  Acts thus became criminal when commissioned under 
circumstances that likely would cause or threaten an interest that criminal law 
sought to protect.218  The test of criminality was the degree of danger shown by 
common experience to accompany that particular act or omission under those 
particular circumstances.219  This test made it unnecessary to determine the 
actual wickedness of the defendant; conduct could instead be judged by its 
“tendency [to cause a certain result] under the known circumstances.”220  “By 
the early twentieth century, it was possible to argue that criminal law was no 
longer concerned with a general ‘mens rea,’ but only with a more specific, 
constrained question of whether the defendant’s conduct reflected the specific 
mental state required by the statute.”221  Criminal liability thus became an 
assessment of the defendant’s conduct measured against the conduct expected 
of the average law-abiding citizen aware of the relevant circumstances known to 
the defendant.  The defendant’s mental state could be inferred from those 
circumstances alone, such that the criminal mind could be known from the 
crime. 
The movement from focusing on the defendant’s general wickedness to his 
conduct and the circumstances of the crime nevertheless required a moral basis 
for finding individual fault.  Otherwise, the “the actor [would be] subjected to 
the stigma of a criminal conviction without being morally blameworthy.”222 This 
reformulated approach therefore focused on the defendant’s willingness to 
engage in harmful conduct, rather than his general maliciousness, to inform his 
criminal liability.  In this move from punishment for general malice or ill will to 
punishment for “an intention to threaten the paradigm interests protected by 
the criminal law,” mens rea and actus reus were joined as the constituent 
elements of a criminal offense.223  The defendant’s awareness of, or 
unreasonable failure to recognize, the circumstances by which his conduct could 
be judged blameworthy became the primary orientation of the modern concept 
of mens rea. 
Today, mens rea refers only to the state of mind that must accompany proof 
of individual elements of particular criminal offenses (such as willfulness, 
intention, or purposefulness), the risks created by the defendant’s conduct 
(recklessness or negligence), the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime, 
 
 217. Hart, supra note 139, at 409. 
 218. HOLMES JR., supra note 144, at 46–47, 75. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 66. 
 221. See Singer, supra note 216, at 244 (“By the early twentieth century, it was possible to argue that 
the criminal law was no longer concerned with a general ‘mens rea,’ but only with a much more 
specific, constrained question of whether the defendant’s conduct reflected the specific mental state 
required by the statute.”). 
 222. Id. 
 223. MCAULEY & MCCUTCHEON, supra note 173, at 275. 
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or “the middle category of ‘knowingly’ committing an offense.”224  To determine 
the existence of any of these mental states, the criminal law does not concern 
itself with the “inner posture of the actor,” but focuses on the “actual risk and 
knowledge of risk” created by the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known 
to the actor at the time he acts.225  Moreover, the mental state intent (mens rea) 
differs from the motive for acting, as illustrated by the Bobo case, in which a 
mother intentionally killed her children, although she harbored no malice 
against them.226  Thus, the trier of fact infers the relevant mental state from the 
circumstances under which the defendant acted, and need not inquire into the 
individual factors motivating the defendant’s conduct.227 
Given these very general principles about mens rea, an actor’s behavioral 
predisposition would have little relevance to whether he acted with the 
requisite mental state for a criminal offense.  In particular, there is an 
incongruity between behavioral genetics evidence and the question of whether 
the defendant acted with purpose, knowledge, or recklessness, as those mental 
states are currently understood, or, more broadly, with “intent,” as that term is 
understood to describe a culpable mental state.  The Supreme Court has noted, 
[i]t is now generally accepted that a person who acts (or omits to act) intends a result 
of his act (or omission) under two quite different circumstances: (1) when he 
consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from 
 
 224. FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 442. 
 225. Id. at 447. 
 226. People v. Bobo, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); see supra Part II.B. 
 227. If, therefore, the actor puts bullets into a gun, places the gun at his friend’s temple, and pulls 
the trigger, the trier of fact will infer he intended to kill his friend, not because killing was his purpose, 
but because that assumption is the commonly understood conclusion to be drawn from the sequence of 
his action.  The Model Penal Code makes a distinction between mental state as an objective inquiry, 
independent of the actor’s actual awareness of the nature and circumstances of his conduct, and mental 
state as a subjective inquiry, but focusing upon the objective nature and circumstances of the actor’s 
conduct and the actor’s awareness of those things.  MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 180, at 235–36.  
Thus, the drafters distinguished between the Washington state code definition of “knowingly” that 
included the defendant’s having “information which would lead a reasonable man in the same 
circumstances to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense” and 
a proposed Michigan definition of “knowingly” providing, “[i]n finding that a person acted knowingly 
with respect to conduct or circumstances, the finder of fact may rely upon proof that under the 
circumstances a reasonable person would have known of such conduct or circumstances.”  The 
Washington standard is an objective one; the Michigan standard makes a subjective determination (the 
defendant’s mental state), relying upon the objective circumstances known to the individual actor.  Id. 
at 236 n.12.  The drafters noted that the proposed Michigan Code only permitted the jury to “draw 
inferences about an actor’s . . . knowledge.”  Id.  They concluded, 
[e]ven without such explicit language, it will generally be true that the actual mental state of 
the actor in most cases will be inferred from the circumstances as they objectively appear to 
the jury, but the critical point is that this language [permitting the inference] should not be 
taken as an invitation to dispense with the need for making the inference. 
Id.  Another commentator noted, “it would appear that an intention to engage in certain conduct or to 
do so under certain attendant circumstances may likewise be said to exist on the basis of what one 
knows.”  LAFAVE, supra note 45, at 246. 
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his conduct; and (2) when he knows that the result is practically certain to follow from 
his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.228 
The inquiry in either case is whether the defendant is “consciously behaving in 
a way the law prohibits” and whether “such conduct is a fitting object of 
criminal punishment.”229  Only the inquiry into the defendant’s conscious desires 
are relevant for determining whether the defendant is acting intentionally, not 
his genetic predispositions. 
Behavioral genetics evidence likewise lacks relevance to whether a person 
acted recklessly or negligently, as those terms generally are used to describe 
culpable mental states.  The drafters of the MPC noted, for example, that 
although its standard for negligence, as well as that for extreme emotional 
disturbance and duress, invites consideration of the “care that a reasonable 
person would observe in the actor’s situation,” this was not an invitation to 
make the inquiry turn on individual quirks: “The heredity, intelligence or 
temperament of the actor would not be held material in judging negligence, and 
could not be without depriving the criterion of its objectivity.  The Code is not 
intended to displace discriminations of this kind, but to leave the issue to the 
courts.”230  The same can be said with respect to determining whether a person 
acted recklessly, the only difference being that in addition to determining 
whether the defendant created a criminal risk, the jury also would have to find 
that the defendant was aware of the risk. 
The defendants in Smith and Bobo did not claim that they were not 
conscious of their conduct; rather, their real claim was that their conscious 
conduct was the product of mental illnesses, for which they alleged a genetic 
origin.  That, however, amounts to nothing more than a claim that the 
defendant was unable to conform his conduct to law.  But, as one commentator 
has noted, the obligations established by criminal law are ones that “normal 
members of the community will be able to comply with, given the necessary 
awareness of the circumstances of fact calling for compliance.”231  When the 
actor actually lacks the ability to comply, which is what behavioral genetics 
evidence has been offered, as in Bobo,232 to show, 
the traditional law provides materials for solution of the problem when inability 
negatives blameworthiness . . . . The materials include doctrines . . . providing for the 
exculpation of those individuals who because of mental disease or defect are to be 
deemed incapable of acting as responsible, participating members of society.233 
 
 228. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978) (quoting W. LAFAVE & 
A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 196 (1972)).  The MPC divides “intent” into acting “purposefully” and 
acting “knowingly,” which corresponds to the two ways the Court identifies for acting “intentionally.” 
 229. Id. 
 230. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 at 242 (Official Draft and Revised Commentaries 1985) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 231. Hart, supra note 139, at 414 (emphasis omitted). 
 232. E.g., People v. Bobo, 271 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Davis, 2001 Tenn. Crim. 
App. LEXIS 341 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). 
 233. Hart, supra note 139, at 414. 
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A claim of irresponsibility is more than just a claim that the actor cannot be 
deterred, “or else the more hardened the criminal, the better would be his claim 
of irresponsibility.”234  What also is involved “is reaching for criteria which will 
avoid attaching moral blame where blame cannot justly be attached, while, at 
the same time, avoiding a denial of moral responsibility where the denial would 
be personally and socially debilitating.”235  Criminal law now finds that balance 
by determining mental states through objective analysis.  There is no place for 
behavioral genetics evidence in the analysis of the nature and circumstances of 
the actor’s conduct as informed by ordinary human experiences.236 
IV 
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND EVADING OR DIMINISHING CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
The development of criminal jurisprudence has left little room for 
behavioral genetics evidence in negating the actus reus or mens rea 
requirements for criminal liability.  Likewise, behavioral genetics evidence has 
limited potential to bolster a defendant’s attempts to evade237 or diminish the 
attribution of criminal responsibility to him238 by arguing that the circumstances 
warrant (justification) 239 or partially excuse240 his behavior (excuse).241 
 
 234. Id. at 414 n.13. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Unrestrained and misguided efforts to introduce behavioral genetics evidence into the analysis 
of culpable mental states could result in preemptive legislative or judicial action to preclude such 
evidence altogether, making it difficult to reconsider its relevance as scientific knowledge advances.  
Could the state preclude the defendant from presenting an entire available category of evidence, such 
as behavioral genetics, to negate proof of a requisite mental state?  The answer appears to be yes.  In 
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996), the Supreme Court considered a state statute that precluded 
the jury’s consideration of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication in determining whether he 
“purposefully” or “knowingly” caused the death of the victim.  In a concurrence Justice Ginsburg 
agreed with the plurality if the statute has been “simply a rule to keep out ‘relevant exculpatory 
evidence’ . . .  Montana’s law offends due process.”  Id. at 57.  But the statute did something more: it 
redefined the mental element of the offense charged, which wholly eliminated any due process concern.  
“[A] ‘state legislature certainly has the authority to identify the elements of the offenses it wishes to 
punish’ . . . and to exclude evidence irrelevant to the crime it has defined.”  Id. (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (quoting id. at 64 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).  Montana, she thought, had extracted “the 
entire subject of voluntary intoxication from the mens rea inquiry.”  Id. at 58 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-205 (1995)).  “Defining mens rea to eliminate the exculpatory value 
of voluntary intoxication does not offend a ‘fundamental principle of justice.’“ Id. at 59.  It seems safe 
to assume that a statute excluding evidence of behavioral genetics as irrelevant to culpability likely 
would not offend the Constitution.  In his dissent Justice Souter acknowledged the right of the state to 
“so define the mental element of an offense that evidence of a defendant’s voluntary intoxication . . . 
does not have exculpatory relevance.”  Id. at 73. 
 237. Hart, supra note 139, at 414. 
 238. See FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 510; HART, supra note 179, at 15. 
 239. DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 202; FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 459 (“A justification negates the 
wrongfulness of the act and denies the element of wrongdoing.”). 
 240. FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 798 (“The focus of the excuse is not on the act in the abstract, but 
on the circumstances of the act and the actor’s personal capacity to avoid either an intentional wrong or 
the taking of an excessive risk.”).  But it is not the actor’s personal capacity to avoid such wrongdoing 
or risks that matters, but the capacity of the reasonable person to do so. 
 241. George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 957 (1985). 
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When evaluating the merits of a justification or excuse, the trier of fact 
compares the defendant’s acts to societal norms or standards of conduct.242  Put 
otherwise, the criminal law allows a determination of whether the 
circumstances warrant attributing to the actor criminal responsibility for the 
crime.243  Although there are exceptions to the general proposition that excuses 
include an invariant legal standard, these are narrowly circumscribed and 
remain consistent with society’s expectations of the norms of human behavior.244  
Justifications and excuses thereby serve as a check against holding a defendant 
to a higher standard of conduct than the average or reasonable person in 
society could be expected to meet under the circumstances.  Because these 
defenses serve as an external check on liability, they rarely implicate the 
defendant’s unique psychological characteristics and instead rely on comparison 
with societal expectations for norms of conduct.245  The criminal law enables this 
external check by reference to a fictitious “reasonable person,” who represents 
the average person of society and the norms of behavior that society expects 
that person to meet.  In the few defenses that enable the defendant to introduce 
his unique perspective, a separate showing of reasonableness is likewise 
required.246 
As of yet, few criminal defendants have sought to introduce behavioral 
genetics evidence to establish a justification or excuse.  Recent legal 
scholarship, however, reveals a growing movement to transform the objective 
assessment of certain defenses into a more subjective one by reformulating the 
 
 242. Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete?  A Critical 
Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 459 (1981) (“[T]he question of 
attribution is to be viewed in light of all relevant facts and circumstances of the individual case.”).  
Donovan and Wildman adopt Fletcher’s characterization that such facts and circumstances imply a 
subjective determination.  Such determinations are in fact standards of general applicability, rather 
than inquiries into the unique infirmities of the individual defendant. 
 243. Id.  Insanity is the only outlier.  It is either an anomaly in jurisdictions with the defense of not 
guilty by reason of insanity (which is theoretically inconsistent with the structure of criminal 
responsibility) or it represents a carefully delineated category of those individuals who are exempt from 
criminal responsibility.  This narrow group would nevertheless not permit the introduction of subjective 
mental infirmities of an individual during the determination of criminal responsibility.  See Saxe, supra 
note 62, at 253 (“Unless a court can make a finding of insanity, the criminal law does not seek to 
understand the uniqueness of the mental deficiency of the criminal defendant.”). 
 244. PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 9.1, at 488–89 (1997) (explaining that insanity, 
involuntary acts, and involuntary intoxication do not seem to incorporate an objective standard, but 
that one would be mistaken “to assume that these defenses excuse without regard for whether the actor 
has met society’s collective normative expectations for efforts to avoid a violation”).  As discussed in 
Part II.C, behavioral genetics could bolster psychiatric testimony in insanity cases, but it should not 
stand alone to satisfy the mental defect element of insanity. 
 245. Id. § 9.1, at 488, § 9.4, at 532–33 (explaining that “in practice, all modern excuses hold an actor 
to some form of objective standard in judging his or her efforts to remain law-abiding,” and that an 
excuse does not derive from a defendant’s disability, because even if “an actor was unfairly burdened in 
having to resist or avoid committing an offense [this] will not excuse him or her if, with reasonable 
effort, he or she could have successfully avoided the violation”). 
 246. Again, insanity serves as an outlier.  Insanity is best understood as a categorical exemption 
from criminal responsibility when presented as “not guilty by reason of insanity.”  The “guilty but 
mentally ill” verdict has little benefit for the criminal defendant and holds him fully responsible for his 
criminal conduct. 
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reasonable person standard in criminal law.247  Proponents of this change 
support augmenting the standard with the allegedly relevant individual 
infirmities of the defendant, so that the defendant’s unique psychological 
perspective may more closely govern the assessment of reasonableness.248  If 
these scholars succeed, the result would be a reasonable person standard—if 
one could call it a standard at all—that would enable criminal defendants to 
introduce behavioral genetics to support claims of justification or excuse as 
relevant to criminal responsibility.249  Properly viewed, however, behavioral 
genetics has limited relevance to the reasonableness inquiry governing the 
evasion or diminution of criminal responsibility. 
A. The Reasonable Person as a Standard of Conduct 
In The Common Law,250 Oliver Wendell Holmes described the standard of 
the “reasonable person,251 which embodies: 
 
 247. See, e.g., Donovan & Wildman, supra note 242, at 465–68 (arguing in favor of a subjective 
reasonable person standard because an objective standard ignores social reality and applies a false legal 
reality to defendant); Heller, supra note 174 (analyzing the problems with the juror cross-section 
concerns obviating the validity of the objective person test, and proposing limited subjectivization of 
the reasonable person standard); Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What 
They Are, and What They Ought to Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 890-93 (2004) (distinguishing 
justifications from excuses and advocating a subjective standard including the actor’s subjective 
perception of the circumstances to evaluate excuses to determine the validity of the excuse); V.F. 
Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2001) (demonstrating that the divide 
between an objective and subjective reasonable person standard is an artificial one); Alan Reed, 
Duress and Provocation as Excuses to Murder: Salutary Lessons from Recent Anglo-American 
Jurisprudence, 6 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 51 (1996) (comparing the English and U.S. system 
of reasonableness, and advocating a subjectivization of the reasonable person standard to include 
unique mental characteristics of the defendant, such as timidity); Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law 
Scholarship: Three Illusions, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 287, 308 (2001) (explaining that although 
there are calls for increased subjectivization of the reasonable person standard, it is unclear which 
characteristics of a defendant should be incorporated); Lauren E. Goldman, Note, Nonconfrontational 
Killings and the Appropriate Use of Battered Child Syndrome Testimony: The Hazards of Subjective 
Self-Defense and the Merits of Partial Excuse, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 185 (1994) (proposing that 
psychological characteristics of abused children should be included in the assessment of reasonableness 
for purposes of an excuse when the focus is on the circumstances of the defendant, rather than the 
crime); Sarah McLean, Comment, Harassment in the Workplace: When will the Reactions of Ethnic 
Minorities and Women be Considered Reasonable? [Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 
1997)], 40 WASHBURN L.J. 593, 609 (2001) (claiming that the reasonable person standard reflects a 
white Anglo-Saxon male bias and should be reformulated to allow the subjective perceptions of women 
and ethnic minorities, particularly with respect to employment discrimination claims). 
 248. See generally sources cited supra note 247. 
 249. See Robinson, supra note 247, at 306 (noting that subjectivization of the reasonable person 
standard could allow criminal defendants to introduce a genetic propensity to violence as a relevant 
characteristic to the reasonableness inquiry). 
 250. HOLMES JR., supra note 144. 
 251. For a succinct discussion of the reasonable person standard, see generally Mark A. Rothstein, 
The Impact of Behavioral Genetics on the Law and the Courts, 83 JUDICATURE 116 (1999).  Rothstein 
summarizes: 
The reasonable person standard, originally expressed as the “reasonable man” standard, was 
first applied to negligence law in England in the middle of the nineteenth century.  The 
concept was soon adopted in the United States.  By the beginning of the twentieth century the 
gender-neutral “reasonable person” came into use and is now used in every state.  The 
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an ideal being, represented by the jury when they are appealed to, and his conduct is 
an external or objective standard when applied to any given individual.  That 
individual may be morally without stain, because he has less than ordinary intelligence 
or prudence.  But he is required to have those qualities at his peril.  If he has them, he 
will not, as a general rule, incur liability without blameworthiness.252 
In Holmes’s description, the individual attributes of the defendant relate only to 
the defendant’s capacity to conform his conduct to the rules of the state.  Thus 
the reasonable person embodies norms of behavior under the relevant 
circumstances against which the jury measures the defendant’s conduct; in 
Holmes’s view, there is no inquiry into what unique biological or other factors 
influenced the defendant’s behavior.  But a second and equally powerful 
explanation of the reasonable person emerges from the criminal law’s role in 
reifying and codifying societal norms of conduct.  As a check on liability, the 
reasonable person standard reflects conduct deemed justified by the state under 
the circumstances, while also providing a tool by which a jury may implement 
and codify societal norms of behavior by comparing the defendant’s actions 
against that expected of the reasonable person under the circumstances.253  In 
such a way, the reasonable person standard may help “to foster, sustain, and 
articulate norms” of behavior in society.254 
Holmes did not fully humanize the reasonable person by giving him a 
gender, age, or any other defining characteristics.  Holmes describes him as an 
ideal being because the reasonable person also reflects societal norms of 
conduct, but the reasonable person standard more appropriately embodies an 
average or ordinary member of society—one who does not excel, who can err in 
his choices, and who makes mistakes, suffers fear and selfishness, and possesses 
 
reasonable person standard is often expressed as the reasonably prudent person, or some 
similar terminology, all of which have the identical meaning. 
Id. at 118. 
 252. HOLMES JR., supra note 144, at 51. 
 253. Hisham M. Ramadan, Reconstructing Reasonableness in Criminal Law: Moderate Jury 
Instructions Proposal, 29 J. LEGIS. 233, 238 (2003) (noting that some argue that reasonableness 
represents societal standards of conduct, and “crystallizes the norms and values of the society and 
incorporates them into a set of rules that govern individuals’ conduct and communicates its meaning to 
the public frankly”).  In his treatise, Criminal Law, Paul H. Robinson also describes the criminal law’s 
role in shaping societal norms: 
The real power in shaping people’s conduct lies in the networks of interpersonal relationships 
in which people find themselves, the social norms and prohibitions shared among those 
relationships and transmitted through those social networks, and the internalized 
representations of those norms and moral precepts. . . . Criminal law, in particular, plays a 
central role in creating and maintaining the social consensus on morality necessary to sustain 
norms.  In fact, in a society as diverse as ours, the criminal law may be the only single 
mechanism that is society-wide, transcending cultural and ethnic differences.  Thus the 
criminal law’s most important real-world effect can be its ability to assist in building, shaping, 
and maintaining these norms and moral principles.  A central role for the criminal law and the 
criminal justice system, therefore, is to contribute to and harness the compliance-producing 
power of interpersonal relationships and personal morality. 
ROBINSON, supra note 244, § 1.2, at 21. 
 254. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 154, at 386 (explaining that law, and negligence law in torts, 
may help to reduce car accidents not only through pricing and prohibition—a stick—but also by helping 
to reify social norms of safe driving and thereby promote “internal deterrence”). 
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other shortcomings to the extent such shortcomings manifest normal standards 
of community behavior.255  Thus understood, the reasonable person exists in 
criminal law as a representation of ordinary and presumed human capacities of 
thought, choice, and reason, and does not don any particular physical 
characteristics or features. 
The purposes underpinning the reasonable person standard help to 
illuminate why it operates without regard to the defendant’s individual mental 
infirmities or behavioral predispositions.  Proponents of the objective 
reasonable person standard generally rely on some combination of the 
following four rationales: 
(1) It creates a community standard of general applicability that affords notice 
to all members of society (standard of conduct);256 
(2) It fosters predictability of outcomes in criminal cases and more evenhanded 
enforcement of the criminal law (equality);257 
(3) It affords ease of administration of the criminal law in light of the difficulty 
of knowing the subjective state of mind of individual defendants 
(administrative ease);258 and 
(4) It ensures that the most dangerous criminals will not be held the least 
criminally responsible (collapse of responsibility).259 
These objectives—creating standards of conduct, ensuring equality, promoting 
administrative ease, and preventing the collapse of responsibility—comport 
with other characteristics of the criminal law—safeguarding the general welfare 
of society while fostering responsible members of society.  More importantly, 
these objectives comport with the limited role of criminal responsibility: to 
determine if a crime was committed and, if so, what crime and by which 
responsible agent. 
 
 255. MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN 
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 132 (2003). 
 256. See HART, supra note 179, at 229 (explaining that the objective standard creates standards of 
conduct that the largest proportion of society can meet and that to require a higher standard than that 
achievable by a large proportion of society lacks efficacy because such a standard could neither come 
into nor continue in existence); HOLMES JR., supra note 144, at 50–51 (expressing the reasonable 
person as an external standard of general application that requires every person to achieve the best 
possible conduct and to deviate from this conduct, even if by incapacity or infirmity, at his own peril).  
Holmes further noted that, “it is precisely to those who are most likely to err by temperament, 
ignorance, or folly, that the threats of the criminal law are the most dangerous.”  Id. 
 257. MORAN, supra note 255, at 207. 
 258. HART, supra note 179, at 175. 
 259. Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 
86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 999–1000 (2002) (discussing which characteristics of a defendant may be 
properly incorporated in the reasonable person defense and noting that the objective standard excludes 
certain characteristics such as short-temperedness, as necessary to the function of the standard).  As 
one of the sources of resistance to subjective determination of liability George Fletcher identified the 
“unresolved anxiety about sociological and psychological determinism that leads many to believe tout 
comprendre, c’est tout pardonner.  If we know everything about the defendant, we will invariably 
excuse him.”  FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 513; see also ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE 191–92 (1967) (noting the concern that a subjective theory of judgment used for justifications 
or excuses other than insanity could result in more acquittals for the most dangerous defendants). 
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To conclude, however, that the objective reasonable person standard is the 
necessary legal standard in fact, two propositions must first be established: (1) 
justifications and excuses operate objectively in practice, and (2) a “subjective” 
reasonable person standard would not achieve the same stated goals.  If the 
reasonable person operates objectively in fact, then evidence of a defendant’s 
behavioral predispositions does not presently inform responsibility.  But if a 
subjective or variable standard would achieve the same four goals, the criminal 
law lacks a principled reason for excluding subjective evidence in assessing 
responsibility. 
B. The Reasonable Person: Objective in Fact 
In Murder and the Reasonable Man, Cynthia Lee frames the typical 
subjective versus objective debate on the reasonable person standard, opining 
that each extreme presents a legal fiction: 
A purely objective standard of reasonableness is one that excludes consideration of 
any of the defendant’s particular characteristics.  Under such a standard, the 
defendant is compared to the Reasonable Person devoid of gender, race, culture, 
religion and any particular strengths or weaknesses.  Of course, no person is devoid of 
identifying characteristics. . . . 
. . . . 
At the other end of the reasonableness spectrum is another legal fiction—a purely 
subjective standard of reasonableness.  Under such a standard, the Reasonable Person 
is imbued with the defendant’s race, gender, class, level of education, and other 
personal characteristics.  If, however, the Reasonable Person has all the defendant’s 
characteristics, the reasonableness standard simply collapses. . . .  Under such a 
standard, if the defendant thinks his beliefs and actions are reasonable, the 
Reasonable Person with all the defendant’s characteristics will likely feel the same.260 
Lee’s conception of an objective standard differs from that described here: the 
“objective” reasonable person standard signifies reasonableness as a standard 
of conduct generally applicable to all members of society without regard to the 
defendant’s individualized beliefs about the circumstances of the crime or 
unique psychological perspective.261  Thus, the term “objective” names the 
specific idea that the trier of fact should evaluate the defendant’s proffered 
justifications or excuses by a standard of conduct that reflects the collective 
expectations of society of how law-abiding members of society can and should 
 
 260. CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE 
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 206–07 (2003). 
 261. George Fletcher offers four conceptions of the difference between objective and subjective: 
(1) ‘Objective standards’ are ‘standards of general application.’ ‘Subjective’ standards by 
implication take ‘account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect and education 
which make the internal character of a given act so different. 
(2) ‘Objective standards’ are external; they apply regardless of whether the actor thinks he is 
doing the right thing; ‘subjective’ standards focus on the actor’s state of mind. 
(3) The question of wrongdoing is an objective standard, for it focuses on the act in 
abstraction from the actor; the issue of attribution is subjective in the sense that it 
focus[]es on the actor’s personal accountability for wrongdoing. 
(4) Standards are objective if they are factual; subjective if they require a value judgment. 
FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 506. 
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behave under the circumstances that confronted the defendant.  The personal 
beliefs, impulses, and desires of the defendant have little practical relevance to 
how law-abiding citizens can and should act under a given set of circumstances.  
To give an obvious example, irrespective of whether an individual defendant 
believes it moral to kill others for pleasure, society still expects that he will 
refrain from doing so precisely because an ordinary member of society can and 
should refrain from doing so.  Thus, the defendant’s belief will not excuse his 
behavior if he kills another individual. 
The criminal law, however, has determined that certain physical 
characteristics of the defendant may inform how a reasonable person in society 
would be expected to act under the relevant external circumstances.  For 
example, one could ask and answer how a reasonable person would likely act if 
attacked by an assailant with greater size and strength who is apparently armed 
with a deadly weapon, without regard to the defendant’s actual perceptions.  To 
answer this question, one need not inquire into the individual beliefs or mental 
infirmities of the particular defendant.  Instead, one need consider only easily 
ascertainable facts external to the mindset of the defendant—such as the size 
and strength of the defendant.  By taking the relative size and strength of the 
defendant into account the reasonableness inquiry has not been transformed 
into an inquiry about the individual beliefs of the criminal defendant.262  The 
criminal law rationally distinguishes between the mental and physical 
characteristics of the defendant because the reasonable person standard reflects 
a generalized standard of mental capacities, not a generalized standard of 
physical characteristics.  Thus, the traditional, “objective” reasonable person 
standard survives the incorporation of certain unusual physical characteristics 
of the defendant (for example, blindness) if relevant, but excludes any unusual 
mental characteristics by definition.263  Against this backdrop, the following 
sections analyze the defenses of provocation and self-defense by battered 
women, both of which have been misperceived as anomalies to the objective 
reasonable person standard. 
C. The Defense of Provocation: A Failed Reformulation 
Under the traditional formulation of the provocation excuse, the extent of 
criminal responsibility ascribable to a defendant will diminish from murder to 
manslaughter if the defendant proves he committed the homicide during a 
 
 262. See State v. Van Dyke, 825 A.2d 1163, 1170–72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (explaining 
that, although certain physical attributes such as age, physical strength, or health could be relevant to 
the reasonable person standard, the appropriate standard is “based on a societal norm rather than the 
exceptional or substandard attributes of an individual”).  Thus, the defendant’s conduct “is measured 
against the standard . . . for the behavior of the entire community.  A defendant’s effort to avoid 
[attribution] of criminal liability should be measured by the same objective societal norm.”  Id. 
 263. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 4 at 242 (Official Draft and Revised Commentaries 1985) 
(noting that, although blindness may be relevant to the reasonable person standard and his “situation,” 
the “heredity, intelligence or temperament of the actor would not be held material in judging 
negligence, and could not be without depriving the criterion of all its objectivity”); DRESSLER, supra 
note 21, at 132. 
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sudden quarrel.264  To mitigate murder to manslaughter, he must prove he acted 
in the heat of passion caused by an adequate provocation.265  At common law, 
mutual combat, assault, and adultery constituted legally adequate 
provocation.266  As society came to view understandable human frailties more 
broadly, these categories were expanded.267 
Historically, a judge determined the adequacy of the provocation as a 
matter of law.268  As new theories of provocation introduced murkiness into this 
consideration, the criminal law relegated to the jury the question of adequacy of 
provocation.269  The criminal law imported the reasonable man or “ordinary 
person”270 test from the law of negligence as a tool for juries to decide these 
marginal cases.271  At its inception, then, the ordinary person test served as a 
tool for use by the jury to assess the extent of criminal responsibility ascribable 
to the criminal defendant based on the circumstances of the crime.272 
The traditional test for provocation has four elements: 
(1) Adequate provocation which would have roused an ordinary person to the 
heat of passion; 
(2) Actual provocation, requiring that the defendant actually have been 
provoked; 
(3) An ordinary person would not have cooled off; and, 
(4) The defendant in fact did not cool off.273 
Although this test appears to invite an individualized determination of whether 
the defendant experienced actual provocation,274 it does so in only a limited 
fashion.  The requirement of actual provocation limits the availability of the 
defense to those who acted as a result of provocation rather than by another 
motive.275  Several factors limit the relevance of behavioral genetics evidence to 
this inquiry.  First, the defendant must have been provoked by the victim and 
not by some other unrelated cause.276  Second, most jurisdictions generally 
recognize categories of provocation under which the victim’s conduct must have 
fallen for the defendant to be entitled to claim adequate provocation, such as 
 
 264. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 242, at 446. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 447. 
 268. Id. 
 269. State v. Ott, 686 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Or. 1984); Donovan & Wildman, supra note 242, at 447. 
 270. Several commentators, including Joshua Dressler, note the inconsistency of calling the 
standard a “reasonable person” standard in the context of provocation since the defense deals with 
unreasonableness.  The defense instead recognizes that the ordinary person sometimes acts out of 
uncontrolled emotion rather than reason.  DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 530–31. 
 271. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 242, at 447–48. 
 272. Id. at 448. 
 273. LEE, supra note 260, at 25; Donovan & Wildman, supra note 242, at 448. 
 274. FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 508. 
 275. DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 533. 
 276. People v. Strader, 663 N.E.2d 511, 515 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); State v. Shane, 590 N.E.2d 272, 276 
(Ohio 1992). 
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physical injury or mental assault, mutual combat or quarrel, illegal arrest, or 
adultery with the defendant’s spouse.277  These categories represent conduct by a 
victim, not some internal mental deficiency of the defendant.  Conceivably, a 
defendant could claim to have misunderstood the situation as a result of a 
behavioral predisposition, but such a claim raises the final concern.  A claim of 
an abnormal response to an external stimuli, triggered by a defendant’s 
behavioral predisposition, may itself cut against a finding of reasonableness in 
the determination of adequacy of provocation such that an ordinary person 
would have reacted as the defendant did.  Otherwise put, for a defendant to 
claim he reacted because of his behavioral predisposition itself sets him at odds 
with the reasonable person standard.  Thus, under the traditional approach to 
provocation, the defense operates through consideration of provocation 
external to the psyche or behavioral propensities of the defendant, rendering 
his  infirmities irrelevant to whether he was actually provoked, and at odds with 
the reasonableness inquiry that follows.278 
In an effort to depart from the traditional approach to provocation,279 the 
MPC adopted section 210.3(1)(b), which provides that criminal homicide 
constitutes manslaughter when “committed under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or 
excuse.  The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined 
from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances 
as he believes them to be.”280  The MPC’s reformulation has been interpreted by 
some as introducing the actor’s actual state of mind into the previously rigidly 
applied provocation defense by allowing the trier of fact to evaluate 
reasonableness from the viewpoint of the actor.281  Under the reformulation, the 
defendant first must offer a reasonable explanation for his alleged extreme 
emotional distress, and, second, must demonstrate the reasonableness of his 
reaction to it from the viewpoint of an ordinary person in the circumstances of 
the accused.282  Regrettably, little guides courts on what factors to consider in 
assessing the circumstances from the viewpoint of the accused under the MPC 
approach.283  Consequently, some courts have allowed defendants to introduce 
certain psychiatric and mental peculiarities as relevant to the defense, even 
 
 277. Strader, 663 N.E.2d at 516; Shane, 590 N.E.2d at 277. 
 278. FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 508; see State v. Bourque, 636 So.2d 254, 268 (La. Ct. App. 1994) 
(“The measure of adequacy of the provocation to cause a defendant to act in ‘sudden heat of passion or 
heat of blood’ is the average or ordinary person, and not the peculiar psychological characteristics of a 
particular defendant.”).  
 279. See State v. Ott, 686 P.2d 1001, 1006–07 (Or. 1984) (detailing how the drafters of the MPC 
arrived at the revision, in part due to disdain for a particular case outcome). 
 280. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Commentaries 1985). 
 281. See State v. Dumlao, 715 P.2d 822, 830 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986) (opining that the Model Penal 
Code reformulation of the provocation defense newly allows subjective mental abnormalities of the 
individual to be considered as part of the defense); LEE, supra note 260, at 207; see also State v. 
Magner, 732 A.2d 234, 241 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997) (interpreting a similar provision in the Delaware 
Code to include a subjective inquiry). 
 282. Magner, 732 A.2d at 241. 
 283. Id. 
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while recognizing that “not all individual peculiarities are relevant.”284  By 
contrast, other courts recognize that the particular psychological condition of a 
defendant cannot inform adequacy of provocation, which should be judged by 
the mental capacities of the ordinary person.285  To the extent that courts, as a 
matter of factual relevance, allow the incorporation of certain physical 
characteristics into the ordinary or reasonable person standard, they do not 
deviate from the purpose of the excuse—to allow the diminution of 
responsibility for ordinary human fallibility.286  To the extent those courts allow 
the incorporation of peculiar mental infirmities, they transform the defense of 
provocation into an individualized determination of the blameworthiness of the 
defendant, contrary to the limited purpose of excusing generalized human 
fallibility.  By allowing the peculiar mental condition of the defendant to govern 
a determination of reasonableness, courts pervert the provocation as an excuse 
and conflate criminal responsibility with culpability and therefore punishment.  
They put the law on a “dangerously slippery slope” and risk “trivializing the 
normative anti-killing message of the criminal law.”287  After all, to ask from the 
unique psychological viewpoint of the defendant whether it seemed reasonable 
to kill, the answer would obviously be yes.  He did, after all, choose to do so. 
In short, criminal law can be deceptive.  Occasionally, as in the MPC’s 
reformulation of provocation, it speaks of personal guilt and uses subjective-
sounding words when, in fact, the drafters of the MPC intended for the 
reasonableness prong of the excuse to continue to operate objectively.288  
Although some interpret the MPC’s approach to allow otherwise, the 
provocation defense operates by “rejecting evidence that a given defendant was 
more fearful than most, more moved to anger than most, more suggestible than 
most.”289  Courts should therefore interpret the MPC’s reformulation as 
enabling the introduction of materially relevant physical traits in the 
circumstances, but not the defendant’s unique mental infirmities or behavioral 
predispositions.  If narrowly conceived, the reformulation will still enable the 
provocation defense to partially excuse human fallibility without collapsing the 
concept of criminal responsibility. 
 
 284. Id. at 243. 
 285. People v. Ali, No. A096034, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1001, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 
2004); State v. Bourque, 636 So.2d 254, 268 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
 286. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 4 at 242 (Official Draft and Revised Commentaries 1985) 
(explaining that physical characteristics may inform the reasonable person but that “heredity, 
intelligence or temperament of the actor would not be held material in judging negligence, and could 
not be without depriving the criterion of all its objectivity”); DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 532 (“The 
heat-of-passion defense recognizes the ordinary human frailty of loss of self-control in provocative 
circumstances.”). 
 287. DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 532. 
 288. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 259, at 18. 
 289. Id. 
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D. The Battered Woman Syndrome: A Matter of Fact 
Self-defense offers an easier challenge to the subjective-versus-objective 
reasonable person debate than does provocation.  A non-aggressor may use 
force upon another if “he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
protect himself from imminent use of unlawful force by the other person.”290  
Like provocation, to succeed on a claim of self-defense the defendant must 
prove he acted in accordance with an honest belief in the need to defend 
himself and that he had a reasonable ground for so doing.291  Self-defense 
functions as a justification that negates the wrongfulness of the defendant’s 
conduct; all fifty states allow it as a justification for homicide.292  It focuses on 
the self-defensive act rather than on the actor,293 through an external assessment 
of the reasonableness of the act in light of the circumstances.  Consequently, a 
defendant will evade criminal responsibility only if “a reasonable person in 
defendant’s circumstances would have perceived self-defense as necessary.”294  
To assess reasonableness, the jury may consider all relevant circumstances in 
which the actor found himself.295  Put simply, the justification of self-defense 
deems protecting oneself from an aggressor socially acceptable or tolerable.296 
Under the theory of self-defense, defendants have introduced evidence of 
Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) to bolster claims of self-defense and to 
assist the trier of fact in deciding the “reasonableness . . . of defendant’s belief 
that killing was necessary.”297  BWS arises primarily in one of two contexts: (1) 
the battered woman killed her partner during an altercation or (2) the battered 
woman killed her partner while he was sleeping or after a significant cooling-off 
period since the last violent attack.298  Cases in the first category do not 
generally challenge the reasonable person standard because they more closely 
fit the classic case of self-defense.  In the latter category, defendants have 
sought to use BWS evidence both to demonstrate that the defendant acted in 
the honest belief of the need to self-defend and also to support the 
determination that the self-defense was reasonable under the circumstances.299  
 The use of BWS in this second category of cases has led some to argue that 
the reasonable person standard has become more individualized, thereby 
paving the way toward introducing other mental infirmities, such as certain 
behavioral predispositions, into the calculation of reasonableness.  This 
 
 290. DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 221. 
 291. Id. at 222.  If the defendant acted sincerely but unreasonably, he would still be held criminally 
responsible for his act.  A few states, however, would allow the partial excuse of imperfect self-defense, 
which mitigates the murder charge to manslaughter.  People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1996); 
People v. Jaspar, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470, 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 222–23. 
 292. Heller, supra note 174, at 11. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 3. 
 295. Jaspar, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476. 
 296. Heller, supra note 174, at 15. 
 297. Jaspar, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476. 
 298. DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 240. 
 299. Id. at 242. 
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argument is flawed, however, because it assumes that the trier of fact compares 
the battered woman to a lower standard of conduct than the reasonable person 
and uses the past history of violence to justify killing the batterer.  BWS does 
not serve this purpose in this (or any other) category of self-defense cases.  In 
fact, the word “syndrome” seems only to confuse matters, given that BWS 
operates more like an evidentiary rule rather than a diminished capacity 
offense.  Indeed, the defendant does not argue that she acted out of rage from 
her repeated abuse, or in an altered and subjectively weaker state of mind than 
the reasonable person.  Instead, she introduces the history of prior abuse and 
the special knowledge available to a battered woman (such as the credibility of 
the abuser’s threat) to endow the reasonable person with additional 
“expertise,”300 much like a specialist physician is held to a specialized standard 
of conduct in negligence cases in tort law.301 
The history of prior abuse, for example, helps inform the jury’s 
determination of whether the defendant honestly and reasonably believed she 
needed to defend herself at the time that she killed her partner.302  For example, 
if the defendant endured a physical confrontation with her abuser that evening, 
during which he told her he would kill her the next morning, and the history of 
her abuse proved his threat was credible and flight was futile, these 
circumstances would assist a trier of fact in deciding whether the defendant 
reasonably believed her batterer presented an imminent threat to her when she 
killed him during his sleep.303  In effect, because “the right of self-defense arises 
only when the necessity begins, and equally ends with the necessity,”304 BWS 
evidence goes to reasonableness of the belief about the imminence of the 
aggressor’s threat of bodily harm305 rather than serving as a justification for an 
unreasonable belief in the threat. 
 
 300. See, e.g., John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 753 (2004) (noting the battered 
woman’s defense need not be about whether the reasonable person standard is subjective or objective, 
but about redefining the imminence of the threat in self-defense).  Thus understood, the battered 
woman’s defense allows the use of past conduct for predicting the likelihood of future harm. 
 301. E.g., Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 308 F.3d 48, 63 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining the proper 
standard of care for evaluating medical negligence by a specialist physician is the skill and care required 
of those in the profession practicing that specialty); Deasy v. United States, 99 F.3d 354, 358–359 (10th 
Cir. 1996) (comparing psychiatrist failure to provide medical treatment for plaintiff’s edema again the 
standard of care for psychiatrists); Myles v. Laffitte, No. 91-1821, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 3274, at *7–*8 
(4th Cir. Feb. 16, 1993) (noting specialists are held to a higher standard of care than general 
practitioners and are measured against the relevant specialist’s skill and care required); Pierce v. 
Hobart Corp., 939 F.2d 1305, 1309–10 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting the state act defined standard of care for 
specialists to be determined by those within the involved medical specialty); Lanier v. Sallas, 777 F.2d 
321, 323 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting the Texas statute holds a specialist physician to the standard of care of a 
similar specialist under similar circumstances); McPhee v. Reichel, 461 F.2d 947, 950 (3d Cir. 1972) 
(jury instruction that ophthalmologist would be held to standard of care of a general practitioner was 
error; specialist owes higher standard of care). 
 302. DRESSLER, supra note 21, at 242. 
 303. Yoo, supra note 300, at 753 (explaining that the battered woman’s defense may redefine the 
concept of imminence in self-defense cases). 
 304. United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 305. State v. Richardson, 525 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). 
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A comparison with provocation provides another useful insight into BWS 
and behavioral genetics evidence.  The battered woman, like the provoked 
defendant, must demonstrate that she reacted in response to the victim to prove 
that she acted under the honest belief that she needed to self-defend rather 
than in response to an internal weakness or abnormality.  Moreover, like 
provocation, self-defense enables the defendant to introduce only certain 
categories of information in support of her defense, such as the history of prior 
abuse and her prior unsuccessful attempts to flee.  Finally, if behavioral genetics 
evidence could be introduced with respect to her actual belief in the need to 
self-defend, the stronger the evidence that she reacted because of a 
predisposition to rage, aggression, or violence, the less likely it is that her 
conduct will be perceived as reasonable under the separate consideration of the 
reasonableness of her conduct. 
Respecting the determination of reasonableness, experts testify about the 
special knowledge the battered woman develops from the threats of her specific 
batterer, which the average member of society would lack.  In particular, “[a]s 
violence increases over time, and threats gain credibility, a battered person 
might become sensitized and thus able to reasonably discern when danger is 
real and when it is not.”306  Expert testimony then “enable[s] the jury to find that 
the battered [woman] . . . is particularly able to predict accurately the likely 
extent of violence in any attack on her.”307  In People v. Humphrey,308 the court 
framed the defense in this manner, explaining that BWS evidence does not alter 
the objective nature of the reasonable person standard in self-defense, but 
operates as a rule of evidence allowing the jury to consider facts and 
circumstances known to the defendant about the particular batterer.309  The jury 
then is able to evaluate whether a reasonable person, aware of the facts of 
circumstances known by the defendant—the specialized knowledge about the 
batterer and his pattern of abuse—would have believed she faced imminent 
danger and acted in self-defense.310 
The narrow relevance of BWS evidence to the inquiry must be 
emphasized—it informs only the homicide of the woman’s batterer, but not that 
of some other seemingly threatening person.  The battered woman defendant 
could not, for example, use BWS evidence to justify killing a person other than 
her batterer because, as a result of her abuse, she may now suffer greater fear 
than most or may react more forcefully than most at the first sign of physical 
aggression.  Likewise, she could not use it to claim the abuse resulted in her 
psychological impairment such that she reasonably (or rather understandably) 
 
 306. People v. Jaspar, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470, 476 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 307. Id. 
 308. 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996). 
 309. Id. at 9. 
 310. Id. 
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acted unreasonably.311  Thus, although BWS may provide the battered woman 
with greater knowledge about her batterer, it does not generally enable her to 
introduce evidence regarding any mental infirmities she may suffer as a general 
defense to her conduct.  Battered woman’s syndrome evidence therefore simply 
endows the reasonable person, otherwise physically or mentally unaltered, with 
additional factual information about the batterer that is part of the 
circumstances contributing to the defendant’s conduct.  It does not transform 
the objective analysis of the justification of self-defense into a subjective one. 
E. The Reasonable Person: Objective by Necessity 
Proponents of the present reasonableness standard believe its success 
depends upon the exclusion of the unique mental infirmities of the defendant.  
They argue that should the reasonable person standard adopt the fallibilities of 
each criminal defendant, rather than embody expected societal norms of 
conduct, the reasonable person would not create a standard of conduct at all.  
After all, the defendant would find his own conduct reasonable under the 
circumstances.  With respect to administrative ease, they explain that an 
individualized reasonableness standard would require the jury to make 
conclusions about the peculiarities governing the defendant’s state of mind—a 
task criminal law has almost always eschewed because of the unreliability and 
infeasibility of such determinations.312  That some jurors may do so on an ad hoc 
basis would not justify institutionalizing this practice.  Which standard would 
afford the greatest equality in practice presents the more challenging question.  
Although this brief review of the issue cannot fully resolve that question, it 
seems intuitive that a system that encourages a comparison between the 
defendant’s conduct and a common standard of conduct would offer the most 
egalitarian outcomes in the assessment of criminal responsibility.  The 
resolution of this issue, however, is a philosophical concern beyond the scope of 
this article.  Moreover, a theoretically consistent system of criminal 
responsibility that focuses on the circumstances of the crime to determine 
responsibility, rather than individual blameworthiness, would reserve the 
inquiry of the personal circumstances of the defendant to the adjudication of 
punishment.  Finally, an objective assessment of reasonableness seemingly 
poses the lowest risk of collapsing the societal checks on liability—justifications 
and excuses.  By preserving the objectivity of these tests, society avoids the path 
of questioning the relevance of each individual infirmity that arises over time, 
and instead relies on norms of conduct, which may evolve over time, but are 
norms nonetheless. 
 
 311. It is possible, however, that such a claim could have relevance to the partial excuse of 
diminished capacity, recognized in a few jurisdictions in the United States.  Farahany’s dissertation 
explores this possibility in further detail.  Farahany, supra note 44. 
 312. See HART, supra note 179, at 261–62 (noting the impossibility about making judgments about 
how a person with the defendant’s mental abnormalities would have behaved under the circumstances, 
particularly given the limitations of medical science on the subject). 
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In short, justifications and excuses, which serve as societal checks on the 
assignment of liability, operate objectively both in fact and in furtherance of 
preserving the reasonable person standard within the constraints of the present 
system.  Except in the limited circumstances discussed above, a defendant’s 
behavioral predispositions should not inform these external checks on liability.  
And because behavioral genetics has limited utility in informing the 
determination of criminal liability,313 behavioral genetics therefore lacks a 
meaningful role in the assessment of criminal responsibility in the present 
system. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Behavioral genetics appears to offer new information about the causes of 
human behavior; its expanse is limited for now because it presently gives only a 
correlation between genetic differences and behavioral differences in a 
population.  But even if scientists eventually discover the vast array of causal 
contributions to human behavior, these discoveries should not implicate 
criminal responsibility as it presently operates in the criminal law. 
The criminal law allows ascription of criminal responsibility to an actor 
upon a finding of liability measured against the external check of justifications 
and excuses.  The concepts underlying liability—legal free will, actus reus, and 
mens rea—do not invite an inquiry into the defendant’s predilections.  Thus, 
behavioral genetics, which at best informs subconscious influences on behavior, 
lacks a practical role in the assessment of liability.  Although a defendant may 
still partially or entirely evade criminal responsibility by presenting a successful 
justification or excuse for his conduct, behavioral genetics lacks a meaningful 
role in these determinations.  If the defendant’s conduct is justified by societal 
norms of conduct, he will evade all criminal responsibility.  If, instead, the 
defendant’s conduct is partially excused, the resulting diminution of criminal 
responsibility is ascribable to the defendant.  In either justification or excuse, 
the defendant’s conduct is compared to societal norms of conduct, embodied by 
the reasonable person standard.  The defendant’s unique infirmities have little 
role in the construction of the reasonable person standard and therefore cannot 
serve to justify or excuse his conduct.  Because genetic predisposition evidence 
is irrelevant to both liability and the defenses of justifications and excuses, it 
should have little role in the negation or mitigation of a defendant’s criminal 
liability. 
We emphasize that this article seeks only to reconcile behavioral genetics 
evidence with our present system of criminal law, by defining the concepts and 
purposes of the doctrines underlying criminal responsibility.  Greater 
knowledge about human behavior or new mechanisms or purposes of criminal 
law could potentially inform a more effective or more just re-imagined system 
 
 313. See supra Part III. 
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of criminal justice.  But those who advocate a re-imagined system should 
reconcile the purposes and mechanisms of that new system with its present 
operation.  Moreover, the conclusion that behavioral genetics evidence does not 
inform criminal responsibility may apply equally to other similar kinds of 
evidence relating to the subjective beliefs and predispositions influencing an 
actor’s conduct.  And although new theories regarding the causes of human 
behavior must be reconciled with the categories of involuntary conduct 
discussed in Part III.B, the broader conclusion—that the unique influences on 
an individual’s decisions have little impact on the assessment of criminal 
responsibility—remains the same. 
Finally, this article leaves open the question of how behavioral genetics may 
affect criminal punishment.  Theoretically, punishment depends upon both the 
crime and the blameworthiness of the individual defendant.  But the current use 
of behavioral genetics evidence during sentencing has resulted in a mixed bag 
for the criminal defendant.  In some instances a defendant’s genetic 
predispositions could mitigate his sentence by reducing his perceived moral 
blameworthiness.  This would most likely occur if a criminal defendant could 
demonstrate that he sought and responded favorably to treatment based on a 
newfound awareness of his genetic predispositions and therefore no longer 
poses a threat to society.  In other scenarios, behavioral genetics might serve—
and has served—as aggravating evidence during sentencing by characterizing 
the defendant as a genetically programmed violent offender, an incorrigible 
danger to society.  Thus, irrespective of how one may reconcile punishment 
theory with behavioral genetics evidence, the criminal defendant should beware 
of its double-edged potential. 
